

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE

THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON, a)	
Washington state agency; THE CENTER FOR)	No. []
HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE UNIVERSITY OF)	
WASHINGTON, a research center created by)	COMPLAINT FOR
state law; and ANGELINA GODOY, director of)	DECLARATORY RELIEF FOR
the Center;)	VIOLATING FOIA
)	
Plaintiffs,)	
)	
v.)	
)	
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; DEFENSE)	
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; and UNITED)	
STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND;)	
)	
Defendants.)	

Plaintiffs, the University of Washington, the Center for Human Rights at the University of Washington, and Angelina Godoy (collectively “the UWCHR”), allege as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1. The UWCHR brings this action under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 *et seq.*, as amended to enjoin the Department of Defense, and its agencies (together, “DOD”) from continuing to improperly withhold agency records regarding three significant military events in El Salvador in 1981 and 1982. There is ample evidence that, in this time, Salvadoran troops carried out a series of massacres and military sweeps that resulted in thousands dead—mostly women and children.

1 2. The first event at issue is the El Mozote Massacre. From December 10 to 12,
2 1981, units of the Salvadoran army's Atlacatl Battalion occupied the village of El Mozote,
3 killed the entire population, and set fire to the buildings. The soldiers interrogated, tortured,
4 and executed the men, raped and killed the women with machine guns, and hanged and slit the
5 throats of the children. A judge in El Salvador has recently reopened the case of El Mozote.

6 3. The second event at issue is the Guinda de Mayo, a major military sweep
7 through the Chalatenango region of El Salvador in May and June 1982. The Atlacatl Battalion
8 and the Belloso Battalion—which the United States trained at Fort Bragg, North Carolina—
9 forcibly disappeared more than fifty people, many of them children.

10 4. The third event at issue is the Teniente Colonel Mario Azenon Palma, a major
11 military sweep through San Vicente in August 1982 ("Azenon Palma"). The Azenon Palma
12 included the El Calabozo massacre, in which the Atlacatl Battalion reportedly killed more than
13 200 people, including women and children. It also included an operation in La Conacastada in
14 which military forces killed a group of civilians, including children, elderly people, and adults,
15 and forcibly disappeared others.

16 5. The United States provided approximately \$5 billion in aid to El Salvador
17 during its Civil War and advised the Salvadoran military on counterinsurgency tactics. The
18 public has the right to investigate and obtain information regarding whether that aid was
19 directed toward any of these condemnable acts. Dr. Rowan Williams, the former Archbishop
20 of Canterbury, who currently chairs a working group of the UK Equality and Human Rights
21 Commission, has observed that the U.S. Government has a "particularly strong moral
22 obligation to make available any records which will assist in bringing to justice those who it
23 previously aided or protected." *See* Ex. A ¶ 12.

24 6. The UWCHR is informed and believes that the DOD possesses responsive
25 records. Numerous DOD records discussing these incidents are publicly available.

JURISDICTION

7. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

VENUE

8. Venue in the Western District of Washington is proper under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). Independently, venue is proper in the Western District of Washington because all Plaintiffs reside in Seattle, Washington.

PARTIES

9. Plaintiff, the University of Washington, is a Washington state agency and the state's largest public research university. Its business offices are in Seattle, Washington.

10. Plaintiff, the Center for Human Rights at University of Washington, is an organization within the University of Washington. The Washington Legislature created the Center for Human Rights in 2009 to expand opportunities for Washington residents to receive a world-class education in human rights, generate research data and expert knowledge to enhance public and private policymaking, and to be an academic center for human rights teaching and research. The Center for Human Rights focuses on, among other things, the rights of all persons to security against violence. Its offices are in Seattle, Washington.

11. Plaintiff, Angelina Godoy, is the director of the Center for Human Rights and the Helen H. Jackson Chair in Human Rights at the Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington. Ms. Godoy resides in Seattle, Washington.

12. Defendant Department of Defense is a federal agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(4) and 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1).

13. Defendant Defense Intelligence Agency is a federal agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(4) and 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1).

14. Defendant United States Southern Command is a federal agency within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 552(4) and 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(1).

FACTS

UWCHR'S FOIA Requests to the DOD

El Mozote

15. On December 7, 2016, Ms. Godoy made, on behalf of the UWCHR, a written FOIA request to Alesia Williams, the Chief of the FOIA and Declassification Services Office for the Defense Intelligence Agency ("DIA"), and to Marco T. Villalobos, the Command FOIA Manager for the United States Southern Command ("Southcom"). The DIA and Southcom are divisions of the DOD. The requests sought:

All information, including but not limited to, biographic sketches, intelligence reports, background, informational reports, briefings, and memos regarding the alleged massacre in El Mozote, in Morazán department, El Salvador on December 11, 1981. We are specifically interested in the documents that were generated by the investigations conducted by Defense attachés stationed at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador from January to March of 1982.

For convenience and contest, both requests included previously released State Department cables that referenced investigations conducted by DOD attachés. The request to the DIA is hereinafter referred to as "Case 198A" and the request to Southcom as "Case 198D."

16. On February 3, 2017, Ms. Williams at DIA responded to Case 198A that "no documents responsive to your request were found."

17. On information and belief, the DIA possesses documents responsive to Case 198A.

18. Attached as Exhibit B is an example of one publicly available document responsive to Case 198A that UWCHR believes to be within the DIA's possession. The document is a cable sent from the American Embassy in San Salvador to the Secretary of State in Washington, D.C. regarding its massacre investigations. Paragraph 2 of the cable state "defense attaches have been trying for days without success to identify units of Salvadoran Army in El Mozote at time massacre allegedly occurred." *See id.*

19. Attached as Exhibit C is another example of a publicly available document responsive to Case 198A that UWCHR believes to be within the DIA's possession. The

1 document is a re-transmittal of the defense attache's February 1982 documentation of the El
2 Mozote massacre. *See id.*

3 20. On May 3, 2017, Ms. Godoy filed an administrative appeal of the DIA's
4 response in Case 198A. On June 1, 2017, Ms. Williams sent a letter to Ms. Godoy informing
5 the UWCHR that DIA would be unable to respond within FOIA's statutory twenty-day time
6 period.

7 21. Southcom has not responded to Case 198D.

8 22. On April 28, 2017, Ms. Godoy made, on behalf of the UWCHR, written FOIA
9 requests to Ms. Williams at the DIA and Mr. Villalobos at Southcom. The requests sought:
10 "All documents, from June 1, 1981 to December 31, 1982, related in whole or in part, to
11 operations of the Salvadoran Armed Forces in Morazan Department, El Salvador. [Including
12 but not limited to sweep operation beginning December 6, 1981.]" Both requests included, for
13 reference, a previously declassified intelligence report regarding the operation. The request to
14 the DIA is hereinafter referred to as "Case 220A" and the request to Southcom as "Case 220D."

15 23. The DIA has not responded to Case 220A.

16 24. On information and belief, the DIA possesses records responsive to the request
17 in Case 220A.

18 25. On June 27, 2017, Mr. Villalobos responded in Case 220D that Southcom
19 "found no responsive records."

20 26. On information and belief, Southcom possesses records responsive to the
21 request in Case 220D.

22 27. Attached as Exhibit D is an example of one publicly available document
23 responsive to Case 220D that UWCHR believes to be within Southcom's possession. The
24 document is a telegram sent from the American Embassy in San Salvador to DOD-Southcom
25 regarding operations of Salvadoran Armed Forces, referencing combat in the Morazán
26 department. *See id.*

1 28. On September 1, 2017, UWCHR filed an administrative appeal in Case 220D.
2 UWCHR has not yet received a response to that appeal.

3 **Guinda de Mayo**

4 29. On September 27, 2016, Ms. Godoy made, on behalf of UWCHR, written
5 requests to Ms. Williams at the DIA and Mr. Villalobos at Southcom. The requests sought:
6 “All documents regarding El Salvadoran military operations in Chalatenango department of El
7 Salvador in May and June 1982, along the Salvadoran-Honduran border near Rio Sumpul.”
8 The request to the DIA is hereinafter referred to as “Case 180A,” and the request to Southcom
9 as “Case 180D.”

10 30. On December 15, 2016, Ms. Williams of the DIA responded in Case 180A that
11 “no documents responsive to your request were found.”

12 31. On information and belief, the DIA possesses records responsive to the request
13 in Case 180A.

14 32. On March 15, 2017, the UWCHR filed an administrative appeal in Case 180A.
15 On April 21, 2017, Michael E. Bearden, the Chief of the Office of Facility Services, responded
16 that DIA had conducted a second search, which located no responsive documents. Mr. Bearden
17 concluded: “I find that DIA personnel performed an adequate search for document responsive
18 to your request. Please be advised that no further action will be taken regarding this appeal.”

19 33. On June 27, 2017, Mr. Villalobos responded in Case 180D that Southcom
20 “found no responsive records.”

21 34. On information and belief, Southcom possesses records responsive to the
22 request in Case 180D.

23 35. Attached as Exhibit E is an example of one publicly available document
24 responsive to Case 180D that UWCHR believes to be within Southcom’s possession. The
25 document is a telegram sent from the American Embassy in Tegucigalpa regarding reports of
26
27

1 massacres during Salvadoran military operations in the Chalatenango department of El
2 Salvador. *See id.*

3 36. On September 8, 2017, UWCHR filed an administrative appeal in Case 180D.
4 UWCHR has not yet received a response to that appeal.

5 37. On September 27, 2016, Ms. Godoy made, on behalf of UWCHR, written FOIA
6 requests to Ms. Williams at the DIA and Mr. Villalobos at Southcom. The requests sought:

7 All document[s] regarding the operations of these following military Units in
8 May and June 1982 in the Chalatenango department in El Salvador along the
9 Salvadoran-Honduran border near Rio Sumpul (Sumpul River).

- 10 • 4th infantry brigade at el Paraiso, Chalatenango
- 11 • First Artillery Brigade at San Juan, Opico
- 12 • Air force
- 13 • The Rapid Response Battalions Ramon Belloso and Atlacatl in Chalatenango

14 The request to the DIA is hereinafter referred to as “Case 182A,” and the request to Southcom
15 as “Case 182D.”

16 38. On December 15, 2016, Ms. Williams responded in Case 182A that “no
17 documents responsive to your request were found” by the DIA.

18 39. On information and belief, the DIA possesses records responsive to the request
19 in Case 182A.

20 40. On March 1, 2017, UWCHR filed an administrative appeal in case 182A. On
21 April 21, 2017, Mr. Bearden responded that DIA had conducted a second search, which located
22 no responsive documents. Mr. Bearden concluded: “I find that DIA personnel performed an
23 adequate search for document responsive to your request. Please be advised that no further
24 action will be taken regarding this appeal.”

25 41. On November 30, 2016, Mr. Villalobos responded in Case 182D that Southcom
26 “found no responsive records.”
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42. On information and belief, Southcom possesses records responsive to the request in Case 182D.

43. On March 1, 2017, UWCHR filed an administrative appeal in Case 182D. On March 18, 2017, Daneaka Spear, the Chief of the Appeals Office for the Department of Defense's Freedom of Information Division, responded that DOD was "unable to complete your appeal within the statutory time requirement."

Azenon Palma

44. On May 16, 2016, Emily Willard (a research fellow at the UWCHR) made, on behalf of the UWCHR, written FOIA requests to Ms. Williams at the DIA and Mr. Villalobos at Southcom. The requests sought:

All records about the Salvadoran military operations in the northern part of San Vicente department, El Salvador in August 1982, including but not limited to the military operation "Teniente Coronel Mario Azenon Palma" or a.k.a. "Mario Azenón Palma" from August 17-30, 1982. We are interested in all records, including but not limited to, reports, briefs, summaries, and talking points before, during, and after the operation(s) within the date range of June 1, 1982 through December 31, 1983.

The requests included additional information about the Azenon Palma operation and attached a previously released CIA document, as well as reports from the United Nations and the UWCHR, discussing the massacre. The request to the DIA is hereinafter referred to as "Case 171A," and the request to Southcom as "Case 171D."

45. The DIA has not yet responded to the request in Case 171A.

46. On information and belief, the DIA possesses records responsive to the request in Case 171A.

47. On June 27, 2017, Mr. Villalobos responded in Case 171D that Southcom "found no responsive records."

48. On information and belief, Southcom possesses records responsive to the request in Case 171D.

49. Attached as Exhibit F is an example of one publicly available document responsive to Case 171D that UWCHR believes to be within Southcom's possession. The document is a cable sent from the American Embassy in San Salvador to the Secretary of Defense (DOD) and Commander in Chief of Southcom (USCINCSO) about Salvadoran military operations in the Department of San Vicente, including operation "Azenon Palma." *See id.*

50. On September 5, 2017, the UWCHR filed an appeal in Case 171D. It has not yet received a response to that appeal.

Atlatl Battalion

51. On November 10, 2016, Ms. Godoy made, on behalf of the UWCHR, written FOIA requests to Ms. Williams at the DIA and Mr. Villalobos at Southcom. The requests sought:

All information, including but not limited to, biographic sketches, intelligence reports, background, informational reports, briefings, and memos regarding the following Salvadoran military officers in their capacity as member of the Salvadoran Army's Unit Atlatl Battalion between January 1980 and December 1982. We are not interested in personal or medical information.

Jose Antonio Rodriguez Molina

Domingo Monterrosa Barrios

Major Natividad de Jesús Cáceres Cabrera

Major José Armando Azmitia Melara

Roberto Alfonso Mendoza Portillo

Jaime Florez Grijalba

Sigifredo Ochoa Perez

Walter Oswaldo Salazar

Juan Ernesto Méndez Rodríguez

José Alfredo Jiménez

1 The request also attached a previously released DIA biosketch of Mr. Barrios. The request to
2 the DIA is hereinafter referred to as “Case 191A,” and the request to Southcom as “Case
3 191D.”

4 52. On January 6, 2017, Ms. Williams at the DIA responded in Case 191A that “no
5 documents responsive to your request were found.”

6 53. On information and belief, the DIA possesses documents responsive to the
7 request in Case 191A.

8 54. Attached as Exhibit G is an example of one publicly available document
9 responsive to Case 191A that UWCHR believes to be within the DIA’s possession. The
10 document is a biographical sketch generated by the Defense Intelligence Agency regarding
11 Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa Barrios of the Atlacatl Battalion. *See id.*

12 55. Attached as Exhibit H is another example of a publicly available document
13 responsive to Case 191A that UWCHR believes to be within the DIA’s possession. The
14 document is a December 1987 biosketch of Colonel Natividad de Jesús Cáceres Cabrera
15 identifying him as serving in the Atlacatl Battalion from 1980-1982. *See id.*

16 56. On April 6, 2017, the UWCHR filed an administrative appeal in Case 191A.

17 57. On September 29, 2017, the DIA responded to the UWCHR’s appeal by
18 producing two documents, both heavily redacted. One document was the identical document
19 the UWCHR had sent to DIA in its appeal—as proof DIA possessed responsive documents—
20 except the DIA had un-redacted only one more sentence. The DIA claimed it was required to
21 redact the documents pursuant to Exemptions 1 and 3. The DIA, however, has publicly
22 released similar documents with far fewer redactions.

23 58. On June 27, 2017, Mr. Villalobos responded in Case 191D that Southcom
24 “found no responsive records.”

25 59. On information and belief, Southcom possesses records responsive to Case
26 191D.

60. On September 15, 2017, the UWCHR filed an administrative appeal in Case 191D.

61. The UWCHR has not received a response to its appeal in Case 191D.

Belloso Battalion

62. On November 2, 2016, Ms. Godoy made, on behalf of the UWCHR, written FOIA requests to Ms. Williams at the DIA and Mr. Villalobos at Southcom. The requests sought:

All documents regarding the operations of the “Belloso Battalion” in El Salvador from 1980 to 1984. The Belloso Battalion was one of the six Batallones de Infantería de Reacción Inmediata (BIRIs, Rapid Reaction Infantry Battalions) formed in the early 1980s with the training and assistance of the United States. The Belloso Battalion was formed in early 1982, the second BIRI created following the formation of the Atlacatl Battalion in 1981. The Belloso was trained at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. It was based in the Zona San Bartolo, an area on the northern outskirts of San Salvador and, like the other BIRIs, had the capability for fast deployment to any of the country’s fourteen departments.

Each request included other titles to which the Belloso Battalion has been referred, as well as previously declassified documents (which were sent to the DIA) that discussed the Belloso Battalion. The request to the DIA is hereinafter referred to as “Case 185A,” and the request to Southcom as “Case 185D.”

63. On November 9, 2016, Ms. Williams at the DIA responded in Case 185A that “no documents responsive to your request were found.”

64. On information and belief, the DIA possesses documents responsive to the request in Case 185A.

65. Attached as Exhibit I is an example of one publicly available document responsive to Case 185A that UWCHR believes to be within the DIA’s possession. The document is a cable sent from Defense Attache Office (USDAO) in San Salvador to the Defense Intelligence Agency mentioning upcoming operations of the Belloso Battalion. *See id.*

66. On January 10, 2017, the UWCHR filed an administrative appeal in Case 185A.

67. The UWCHR has not received a response to its appeal in Case 185A.

68. On June 27, 2017, Mr. Villalobos responded in Case 185D that Southcom “found no responsive records.”

69. On information and belief, Southcom possesses documents responsive to the request in Case 185D.

70. Attached as Exhibit J is an example of one publicly available document responsive to Case 185D that UWCHR believes to be within Southcom’s possession. The document is a cable sent from the Department of Defense (USDAO) to the Commander in Chief of Southcom (USCINCSO) regarding the operations of the Belloso Battalion. *See id.*

71. On September 5, 2017, the UWCHR filed an administrative appeal in Case 185D.

72. The UWCHR has not received a response to its appeal in Case 185D.

Key Military Commanders

73. On March 9, 2017, Ms. Godoy made, on behalf of UWCHR, written FOIA requests to Ms. Williams at the DIA and Mr. Villalobos at Southcom. The requests sought: “All documents including, but not limited to, memos, cables, briefings, and intelligence reports regarding El Salvador’s former Minister of Defense Jose Guillermo Garcia in his official capacity.” The requests also included additional background information on Mr. Garcia and a previously declassified biography of Mr. Garcia from the CIA. The request to DIA is hereinafter referred to as “Case 200A,” and the request to Southcom as “Case 200D.”

74. On March 24, 2017, Ms. Williams at the DIA responded in Case 200A that “no documents responsive to your request were found.”

75. On information and belief, DIA possesses documents responsive to the request in Case 200A.

76. Attached as Exhibit K is an example of one publicly available document responsive to Case 200A that UWCHR believes to be within Southcom’s possession. The

document is a cable sent from the Department of Defense to the Defense Intelligence Agency regarding former Minister of Defense Jose Guillermo Garcia. *See id.*

77. On June 13, 2017, the UWCHR filed an administrative appeal in Case 200A.

78. On June 27, 2017, Mr. Villalobos responded in Case 200D that Southcom “found no responsive records.”

79. On information and belief, Southcom possesses documents responsive to the request in Case 200D.

80. Attached as Exhibit L is an example of one publicly available document responsive to Case 200D that UWCHR believes to be within Southcom’s possession. The document is a telegram from the Department of State entitled “The General (Garcia) who Came for Lunch” and was sent to Southcom on February 9, 1982. *See id.*

81. Attached as Exhibit M is another example of a publicly available document responsive to Case 200D that UWCHR believes to be within Southcom’s possession. The document is a cable from the Department of State entitled “Defense Minister Garcia’s Speech to American Chamber ... of Commerce” from April 1981. *See id.*

82. On information and belief, Southcom possesses documents responsive to the request in Case 200D.

83. On August 29, 2017, the UWCHR filed an administrative appeal in Case 200D.

84. The UWCHR has not yet received a response to its appeal in Case 200D.

85. On May 1, 2017, Ms. Godoy made, on behalf of the UWCHR, written FOIA requests to Ms. Williams at the DIA and Mr. Villalobos at Southcom. The requests sought:

All documents from January 1, 1980 to the present regarding Salvadoran Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa Barrios. The areas of his career of greatest interest are: 1) his service as Commander of the Atlacatl Battalion during the December 1981 “Operation Rescate” in the Morazan Department, and 2) his service as Commander of the Atlacatl Battalion during the August 1982 operation in San Vicente. During both these periods, there is ample evidence of massacres against civilians carried out by troops under his command.

1 The requests also included an outline of Lt. Colonel Monterrosa's military career and several
2 attachments, including a Department of Defense document that referenced Monterrosa by
3 name. The request to the DIA is hereinafter referred to as "Case 218A," and the request to
4 Southcom as "Case 218D."

5 86. The DIA has not yet responded to the request in Case 218A.

6 87. On information and belief, the DIA possesses records responsive to the request
7 in Case 218A.

8 88. Attached as Exhibit N is an example of one publicly available document
9 responsive to Case 218A that UWCHR believes to be within the DIA's possession. The
10 document is an October 14, 1981 cable from the Department of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff
11 Message Center to the DIA regarding the "status of new Atlacatl Battalion," mentioning
12 Monterrosa as its commander. *See id.*

13 89. On June 27, 2017, Mr. Villalobos responded in Case 218D that Southcom
14 "found no responsive records."

15 90. On information and belief, Southcom possesses records responsive to the
16 request in Case 218D.

17 91. Attached as Exhibit O is an example of one publicly available document
18 responsive to Case 218D that UWCHR believes to be within Southcom's possession. The
19 document is a cable sent from the Department of Defense (USDAO) in San Salvador to the
20 Commander in Chief of Southcom (USCINCSO) describing remarks made by Salvadoran
21 Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrossa regarding "Operation Rescate." *See id.*

22 92. On September 1, 2017, the UWCHR filed an administrative appeal in Case
23 218D.

24 93. The UWCHR has not received a response to its appeal in Case 218D.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

**Violation of FOIA by the DOD for Failure to Make Promptly Available
the Records Sought by the UWCHR's Requests.**

94. UWCHR repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 93 above, inclusive.

95. UWCHR has a legal right under FOIA to obtain the agency records it requested in Cases 171A, 171D, 180A, 180D, 182A, 182D, 185A, 185D, 191A, 191D, 198A, 198D, 200A, 200D, 218A, 218D, 220A, and 220D, and there exists no legal basis for the DOD's failure to make these records available to the public.

96. The DOD's failure to make promptly available the records sought by UWCHR's requests violates FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) and (a)(6)(A)(ii), and applicable regulations promulgated thereunder.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request the Court award them the following relief:

A. Declare that the DOD has violated FOIA in its responses to the FOIA requests;

B. Order the DOD to immediately disclose the requested records to Plaintiffs and enter an injunction prohibiting the DOD from continuing to withhold the requested records from the public;

C. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable costs and attorneys' fees;

D. Grant such further relief as the court may deem just and proper.

DATED this 11th day of December, 2017.

Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
Special Assistant Attorneys General

By /s/ Jordan Clark

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8 Human Rights at the University of
9 Washington, the University of Washington
10 and ANGELINA GODOY

11 **pro hac vice application forthcoming*
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EXHIBIT A

DECLARATION OF DR ROWAN DOUGLAS WILLIAMS, MASTER OF MAGDALENE COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, SOMETIME ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY.

I, Rowan Douglas Williams, am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify as follows:

1. I am a member of the British House of Lords and of Her Majesty's Privy Council, Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge, Chancellor of the University of South Wales and Chair of Trustees of Christian Aid (the major church-based international development agency in the UK).
2. Prior to my current position, I was Archbishop of Canterbury and before that had a long career as priest, bishop and theologian, holding academic appointments in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. I am a Fellow of the British Academy, of the Royal Society of Literature and of the Learned Society of Wales.
3. I held the office of Archbishop of Canterbury from 2002 to 2012, maintaining a close watch on global events throughout and since that period, with a special concern for human rights, on which I have lectured in Geneva to UN bodies. I currently chair a working group of the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission. I have studied the origins and consequences of El Salvador's civil war and have met with people living in El Salvador during the conflict including the late Archbishop Romero's former secretary and the Anglican bishop in El Salvador, Martin Jesus de Barahona and his family; these were people with direct firsthand experience of conditions during the war and the levels of violence against civilians.
4. Through these contacts in particular, I have built up a clear picture of the situation in El Salvador, especially of the patterns of violent intimidation of critics of the regime during the civil conflicts, and the harassment, threat, and assault suffered by those offering help to victims of violence.
5. My interest as a Christian leader naturally focused on the late Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar Romero (I am now a patron of the UK based Oscar Romero Foundation). Mgr Romero was a moral leader of exceptional stature, and an outspoken critic of the widespread violent crimes perpetrated by the then government against its own people. I have in recent years read much about and spoken and written about Archbishop Romero.
6. Romero in my view was a great gift of God to the whole people of God, in and beyond El Salvador. He gave voice to the cries of the poorest and most marginalized, embracing this role most fully and passionately after the slaughter of unarmed peasants by the Salvadorean National Guard and the murder of his Jesuit friend Fr Rutilio Grande, in March 1977.
7. Romero urged the soldiers of the government to lay down their arms rather than obey unjust orders, and commanded the leaders of El Salvador to stop the killing and intimidation. These efforts to use his role as a church leader to protect the poor and vulnerable resulted in his assassination on 24 March 1980. He is commemorated as a martyr in the Church of England (his statue can be seen on the West Front of Westminster Abbey) and the Roman Catholic Church. Earlier this year (May 2015) he was beatified by the Roman Catholic Church, the penultimate step before being officially declared a saint.
8. To be declared a martyr means that someone is recognised as having given their life in defence of the Christian faith. The significant aspect of declaring Romero a saint and martyr is that it recognizes that advocacy for the poor and the defence of justice may be counted as defence of the Christian faith.
9. I understand that the University of Washington Center for Human Rights (UWCHR) is collaborating with a human rights centre in El Salvador in an effort to gather evidence

regarding massacres of civilians which took place during the civil war, as well as evidence regarding the assassination of Mgr Romero. One purpose of this is to assist the effort to bring various charges, including war crimes, against some of those who were involved in these acts.

10. I strongly support UWCHR's efforts to obtain justice for the victims of the Salvadorean civil war.
11. I further understand that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has refused to disclose to the UWCHR records which it holds that may be relevant to these crimes.
12. Echoing Mgr Romero's call to the government of El Salvador to act transparently and ethically, I would make the same plea to the US government. The US administration, including the CIA, was deeply involved in El Salvador's civil war. The US government provided billions of dollars' worth of military and economic assistance to the government of El Salvador during the period of the war, despite widespread media exposure of the massacre of civilians and many other violations of human rights in El Salvador. In the light of this, the US administration has a particularly strong moral obligation to make available any records which will assist in bringing to justice those whom it previously aided or protected.

I declare that the foregoing is true and correct under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America.

EXECUTED on this tenth day of August, 2015, at Magdalene College, Cambridge, UK.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "Rowan Williams".

Rowan Douglas Williams, Lord Williams of Oystermouth, PC

Master of Magdalene College, Cambridge

Sometime Archbishop of Canterbury

Master's Lodge

Magdalene College,

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EXHIBIT B



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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AN: D820056-0186

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PAGE 01 SAN SA 00825 01 OF 02 020334Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----306353 020347Z /60
O 021338Z FEB 82
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7701

C C N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SAN SALVADOR 0025

END IS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 2/1/02 (HINTON, DEANE R.) OR-M
TAGS: PINS, PINR, MILI, ES
SUBJ: (C) MORE ON ALLEGED MORAZAN MASSACRE: SAN ANTONIO ABAD:
AND NUNS

1. (C-ENTIRE TEST.)

2. SINCE DEFENSE ATTACHES HAVE BEEN TRYING FOR DAYS WITHOUT SUCCESS TO IDENTIFY UNITS OF SALVADORAN ARMY IN EL MOZOTE AT TIME MASSACRE ALLEGEDLY OCCURRED, I QUERIED MILGP COMMANDER TODAY IF IT WERE POSSIBLE HIGH COMMAND DID NOT KNOW WHERE AND WHEN THEIR FIELD FORCES OPERATED. NOT IT WAS HQZ, HE TOLD ME. ACCORDINGLY I ASKED HIM TO GET ANSWER.

3. HE WENT TO CHIEF OF STAFF, WHO SAID DEFENSE MINISTER WANTED NO ONE OTHER THAN HIMSELF TO DEAL WITH THAT QUESTION.

4.. THIS AFTERNOON I CALLED ON GENERAL GARCIA.
HE JOSHED A BIT AS IS OUR MONT. THEN GARCIA COMPLIMENTED
ME ON MY WASHINGTON POST INTERVIEW WHICH HE SAID PUT
THINGS EXACTLY RIGHT. I THANKED HIM BUT SAID HE HAD
BETTER KEEP THAT OPINION TO HIMSELF SINCE I UNDERSTOOD
TOM ENOERS HAD TODAY TOLD THE LONG COMMITTEE THAT HE
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DID NOT SHARE MY VIEWS ABOUT MILITARY MATTERS.

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Department of State 1845 DC CDS, El Salvador SF Data 7/17/93
Declassified under EO 13526 (X) in full: () in part;
portions withheld: classified () declassatory () ;
law enforcement () ; privacy () ; statutory () ;
ICL relevant to El Salvador () .

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5. WITH THE MENTION OF ENDERS, I EXPLAINED TO GARCIA THAT TOM HAD TODAY GONE TO CONGRESS TO DEFEND THE ADDITIONAL 55 MILLION IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADO AND THAT FOR A GOOD PART OF THE REST OF THIS WEEK HE WOULD BE BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES EXPLAINING THE PRESIDENT'S CERTIFICATION WHICH PERMITTED CONTINUED AID TO EL SALVADOR. IN THIS CONNECTION, I SAID, REPORTS PUBLISHED IN THE WASHINGTON POST AND THE NEW YORK TIMES ABOUT ALLEGED MORAZAN MASSACRE AND THE INCIDENT OF NIGHT BEFORE LAST CAUSED GREAT CONCERN. I ADDED THERE WAS ONE GOOD SENTENCE IN THE BONNER PIECE AND READ TO HIM THE SENTENCE SAYING THERE WAS NO INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION WHO DID THE KILLINGS AND HOW MANY HAD BEEN KILLED.

6. HE SAID THE MORAZAN BUSINESS WAS A "NOVELA". PURE MARXIST PROPAGANDA DEVOID OF FOUNDATION.

7. I SAID IT WAS CLEARLY PROPAGANDA THAT ITS TIMING HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CALCULATED BUT THERE WERE SO MANY DETAILS THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH THE STORIES. I WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED OVER THE REFERENCES TO THE ATACATL BATTALION AND LTS. CACERES AND ORTEGA. COULD HE TELL ME IF THE ATACATL BATTALION HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ENGAGED AT EL MOZOTE. COULD HE TELL ME WHO LTS. CACERES AND ORTEGA WERE. HE SAID IMMEDIATELY THAT THERE WAS A MAJOR CACERES WHO WAS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER OF THE ATACATL BATTALION AND WHO WAS A STRAIGHTFORWARD, HONORABLE SOLDIER WHO WOULD NEVER HAVE KILLED WOMEN AND CHILDREN AS DESCRIBED IN THE STORY.
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HE DID NOT KNOW WHO LT. ORTEGA MIGHT BE BUT HE WOULD INQUIRE. AFTER SOME FURTHER DISCUSSION, HE SAID THE ATACATL BATTALION HAD BEEN AT EL MOZOTE DURING THE DECEMBER SWEEP. BUT HE REITERATED THAT THE STORY WAS A PACK OF LIES. HE WOULD HOWEVER, TALK TO MAJOR CACERES AND GET HIS STORY SO THAT HE WOULD BE PREPARED WHEN HE GOT TO WASHINGTON AND HE WOULD ALSO EXAMINE THE DAILY ACTION REPORTS RECEIVED FROM UNITS IN THE OPERATION REPORTING ON FRIENDLY, ENEMY, AND OTHER CASUALTIES

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TO SEE WHAT THEY SHOWED. HE ASKED ME TO LEAVE
WITH HIM THE STORIES AND I DID SO ADDING AS A
SWEETNER THE WASHINGTON POST EDITORIAL OF JANUARY 29
SUPPORTING OUR COMMON POLICIES. AS FOR THE SAN
ANTONIO ABAD INCIDENT, THAT TOO WAS BEING DISTORTED

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HIM ONCE AGAIN TO EXHORT HIS COMMANDER TO EXERCISE MORE RIGOROUS CONTROL OVER THEIR FORCES.

10. GARCIA THEN SAID IT WAS INTERESTING THE LEFT WAS NO LONGER SAYING ANYTHING ABOUT THE NUNS CASE AND WE AGREED THAT THIS WAS BECAUSE REAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AND THEY KNOW IT.

11. HE THEN SAID HE WANTED TO TELL ME OF GROWING RESENTMENT IN THE ARMY OVER PROPOSALS FROM POLITICIANS, THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE TURNOVER OF THE ACCUSED FOR TRAIL MIGHT BE MADE BY POLITICANS AND NOT BY THE ARMED FORCES. FROM THIS I INFERRED THAT HE AND DUARTE ARE BICKERING OVER WHO WILL SAY WHAT, WHEN. HE ASKED ME FOR MY VIEW.

12. I REPLIED THAT IN MY PERSON OPINION IT WAS NOT TOO IMPORTANT WHO MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT BUT THAT IT WAS CRUCIAL THAT THE PRISONERS NOT BE TURNED OVER TO THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES UNTIL THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES HAD SORTED OUT HOW TO HANDLE THE PROSECUTION. I SAID I HAD JUST LEARNED THAT AS OF SATURDAY, FISCALIA (ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE) WAS FAR FROM HAVING DEVELOPED A PROSECUTION STRATEGY THAT WOULD WORK. NO ONE, IN MY VIEW, NEITHER THE ARMED FORCES NOR THE POLITICIANS, NOR MY GOVERNMENT COULD BENEFIT FROM A LACK OF CARE ON JUDICIAL QUESTIONS WERE THAT TO UNDO THE SPLENDID EFFORTS OF THE MILITARY INVESTIGATION. WHAT WE WANTED WAS FOR THE KILLERS TO BE BROUGHT EFFECTIVELY TO JUSTICE. ONCE THE CASE WAS READY FOR PRESENTATION DE A
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THE ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD OF COURSE BE MADE BY WHOM WAS NOT MY PRINCIPAL CONCERN AND, IN THE MEANTIME, GENERAL STATEMENTS SUCH AS HE HAD MADE LAST WEEK COULD BE USEFUL.

13. HE ASKED ME WHEN I THOUGHT THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES WOULD BE READY. I SAID I HOPED WITHIN A FEW DAYS. HE SAID HE HOPED SO, TOO, BECAUSE THE GUARD, IN ADDITION TO ITS OTHER PROBLEMS, WANTED TO BE FREED OF GUARDING THE PRISONERS.

14. I TOOK MY LEAVE. HE THANKED ME FOR ALERTING HIM
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TO THE NEED TO BE WELL PREPARED FOR HIS VISIT TO
WASHINGTON, AND I WISHED HIM A GOOD TRIP.

15. COMMENT: GARCIA'S ACCOUNT IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF SAN ANTONIO
ABAD INCIDENT IS INCONSISTENT BOTH WITH THE RELEASE
ISSUED BY THE HIGH COMMANDE LISTING MULTIPLE
LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT AND WITH J CEPORT BYSF
PALACIOS TO DATT THAT THERE WAS A FIRE WHICH CAUSED
CONFUSION AND LET TO PERHAPS INNOCENT PEOPLE
BEING KILLED.
HINTON

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EXHIBIT C

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TEXT: 1. (C/NF) AS THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ALLEGED EL MOZOTE //GEO COORD 1355N 8808W// MASSACRE BY BIRI ATACATL TROOPS APPROACHES, THE ISSUE IS GAINING CONSIDERABLE MOMENTUM AS A RENEWED HUMAN RIGHTS RALLYING CRY. THE FOLLOWING IS A RE-TRANSMITTAL OF THE ONLY ON-STATION USDAO SAN SALVADOR DOCUMENTATION OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENT. IT IS RE-TRANSMITTED AS A BASELINE DOCUMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. COMMUNITY-WIDE DOCUMENT SEARCH IS REQUESTED ON BEHALF OF AMBASSADOR. RE-TRANSMITTED IIR IS CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN IN ENTIRETY.

BEGIN QUOTE:

- FROM: USDAO SAN SALVADOR ES
- TO: DIA WASH DC//JSI-4B/OS-1 /DB-3E2//DB-3E
- INFO: USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN//SCJ2
- CDR193RDINFBDE(PAN) FT CLAYTON PN//IAGPP-PN
- COMUSFORCARIB KEY WEST FL//J2
- USDAO GUATEMALA CITY GT
- USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
- CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN
- SUBJ: IR 6 829 0038 82/EL SALVADOR/CONVERSATION WITH ATACATL BATTALION OFFICERS CONCERNING ALLEGED MIS-CONDUCT OF THE ARMY IN MORAZAN DEPARTMENT/(U)
- THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
- 1. (U) CTRY: EL SALVADOR (ES)
- 2. (U) IR NO: 6 829 0038 82
- 3. (U) TITLE: CONVERSATION WITH ATACATL BATTALION OFFICERS CONCERNING ALLEGED MIS-CONDUCT OF THE ARMY IN MORAZAN DEPARTMENT.
- 4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 820201
- 5. (U) ORIG: USDAO SAN SALVADOR, ES
- 6. [REDACTED] *NIC*
- 7. (U) SOURCE: [REDACTED] *(C) S/M*
- 8. (C/NOFORN) SUMMARY: (ENTIRE TEXT) CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN) THIS IR PROVIDES A SUMMARY OF REMARKS MADE BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSE DOMINGO ((MONTERROSA)), COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE ATACATL BATTALION; MAJOR JESUS NATIVIDAL ((CASERES)), EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE ATACATL BATTALION; MAJOR JOSE ARMANDO

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((AZMITIA)) MELARA, S-3 OF THE ATACATL BATTALION ON THE ALLEGATIONS THAT ATROCITIES WERE COMMITTED BY ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF EL SALVADOR. THE INCIDENT DISCUSSED IN THESE CONVERSATIONS IS ALLEGED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE VICINITY OF EL MOZOTE (1355N-8808W), MORAZAN DEPARTMENT, DURING OPERATION "RESCATE" (6-17 DECEMBER 1981). THE ATACATL BATTALION PARTICIPATED IN OPERATION "RESCATE".

- 9A. (C/NOFORN) DETAILS: (ENTIRE TEXT CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)

- (1) THE EXACT PURPOSE OF RO'S VISIT TO THE ATACATL BATTALION (I.E. TO DETERMINE THE MISSION ASSIGNED, AND SUCCESSIVE POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY THE BATTALION DURING OPERATION "RESCATE"; AND TO SPECIFICALLY DETERMINE IF THE BATTALION, OR ELEMENTS THEREOF, WERE INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING AROUND AND IN EL MOZOTE, MORAZAN DEPARTMENT DURING THAT OPERATION) WAS PUT TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER, LTC MONTERROSA SHORTLY AFTER GREETINGS AND PLEASANTRIES WERE EXCHANGED. LTC MONTERROSA REMAINED DISTANTLY COURTEOUS, BUT HE FIRMLY TOLD RO THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS THESE SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, AND THAT RO HAD BETTER OBTAIN PERMISSION FROM THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES BEFORE HE CAME WITH SUCH INQUIRIES TO HIS (LTC MONTERROSA'S) BATTALION. (RO NOTE: QUITE FRANKLY, RO FELT THAT THE INTERVIEW, ALBEIT SHORT, WAS THUS TO BE TERMINATED). RO MADE THE OBLIGATORY APOLOGIES FOR WHAT THE COLONEL MAY HAVE INTERPRETED AS IMPERTINENCE. RO ALSO POINTED OUT THAT CANDID ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS POSED WOULD FACILITATE COUNTERING RECENT PRESS RELEASES WHICH WERE LESS THAN COMPLIMENTARY TO THE ARMED FORCES OF EL SALVADOR.

- (2) AT THIS POINT MAJOR AZMITIA INTERJECTED WITH WHAT CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS A PARABLE: THE UNIT THAT HAD FOUGHT AT EL MOZOTE HAD HAD A TOUGH TIME OF IT, AND THAT BECAUSE OF THE INTENSITY AND DURATION OF THE BATTLE (RO NOTE: MAJOR AZMITIA SEEMED TO SLIP HERE, AS HE USED THE FIRST PERSON PLURAL "WHEN WE APPROACHED EL MOZOTE IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON...." "CUANDO NOS ACERCAMOS A AQUEL PUEBLO EN LA TARDE.....") THERE WERE UNDOUBTEDLY CASUALTIES AMONG NON-COMBATANTS. COL MONTERROSA THEN TOOK UP THE NARRATIVE. HE SAID THAT THE UNIT INVOLVED HAD HAD TO FIGHT THROUGH FIXED ENEMY POSITIONS, THEN, ONCE IN THE TOWN, FIRE WAS RECEIVED FROM THE HOUSES IN THE TOWN (RO NOTE: LTC MONTERROSA NOW UTILIZED THE FIRST PERSON: "I DO NOT HAVE X-RAY VISION, AND I CAN NOT SEE INSIDE THE HOUSE FROM WHICH SOMEONE IS SHOOTING AT ME; NOR IN THOSE TYPE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AM I VERY DISPOSED TO WASTE TIME TRYING TO FIND OUT WHO ELSE MIGHT BE IN THE HOUSE.") LTC MONTERROSA THEN STATED (IN THE THIRD PERSON) THAT 90MM RECOILESS RIFLES WERE USED AGAINST THE HOUSE FROM WHICH FIRE WAS RECEIVED. AT THIS

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POINT LTC MONTERROSA SAID HE WANTED TO REITERATE TO RO THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHICH DAY (OF THE OPERATION) RO WAS INTERESTED IN, AND THAT HE WAS ONLY SPEAKING IN GENERAL, NOT SPECIFIC, TERMS ABOUT WHAT HAD OCCURRED AT EL MOZOTE.

- (3) MAJOR AZMITIA COMMENTED THAT "THEY HAD BEEN THERE (EN LA ZONA DE MOZOTE) FROM EARLY AFTERNOON UNTIL LATE IN THE AFTERNOON (DESDE LAS TEMPRANAS HORAS DE LA TARDE HASTA MUY TARDE) FIGHTING." THEN HE SWITCHED TO THE THIRD PERSON AND SAID THAT CASUALTIES HAD BEEN HEAVY (NFI) AMONG GOVERNMENT TROOPS. AS AN ASIDE, HE SAID THE FIGHTING IN ARAMBALA (1356N-8808W), MORAZAN DEPARTMENT, HAD NOT BEEN SO HEAVY.

- (4) RO ASKED LIEUTENANT COLONEL MONTERROSA IF HE KNEW IF ANY PRISONERS HAD BEEN TAKEN DURING OR AFTER THE BATTLE FOR EL MOZOTE. AGAIN, THE COLONEL ASSUMED AN ADAMANT DEMEANOR, AND SUGGESTED THAT RO CONSULT WITH THE GENERAL STAFF, OR GET PERMISSION FROM THE GENERAL STAFF TO ASK HIM SUCH QUESTIONS. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO REPEAT THAT HE COULD NOT ANSWER RO'S QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS BATTALION'S PARTICIPATION IN THE RESCATE OPERATION UNTIL HE HAD PERMISSION FROM THE GENERAL STAFF TO DO SO. THEN HE SEEMED TO MELLOW SOMEWHAT, AS HE EXPRESSED WHAT APPEARED TO BE GENUINE INTEREST IN REVIEWING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ATLACATL BATTALION, WITH RO, IN THE ENTIRE OPERATION. IF THE GENERAL STAFF WOULD NOTIFY HIM THAT HE COULD DO SO, HE WOULD SIT DOWN WITH RO AND SHOW HIM HOW HIS BATTALION MOVED, THE ORDERS HE ISSUED (HE CLAIMED HE KEPT THESE), AND HOW THE ENEMY REACTED. LACKING GENERAL STAFF APPROVAL, HE COULD NOT, AND HE STATED HE WAS SORRY HE COULD NOT, PROVIDE RO WITH THE ASSISTANCE HE WAS SEEKING. THE INTERVIEW HAD COME TO AN END

N16

- (6) RO WAS ESCORTED TO HIS VEHICLE BY MAJOR AZMITIA, WHO ACTED APOLOGETIC ABOUT THE FACT THAT THEY COULD NOT PROVIDE MORE FACTS ABOUT EL MOZOTE, BUT HE WAS SURE THAT THE RO UNDERSTOOD WHAT LTC MONTERROSA HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT.

- 9B. (C/NOFORN) ORIG CMTS: (ENTIRE TEXT
CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)

- (1) THE ABOVE INTERVIEW WAS ARRANGED BASED ON AN INQUIRY BY THE AMBASSADOR TO TRY AND DETERMINE WHAT UNIT OR UNITS PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON EL MOZOTE DURING OPERATION "RESCATE". RO ARRIVED AT ATLACATL BATTALION

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HEADQUARTERS SHORTLY AFTER 1500 HOURS (L) ON 1 FEBRUARY 1982
HE LEFT SHORTLY AFTER 1700 HOURS (L).

(2) MAJOR AZMITIA WAS PRESENT DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD RO SPENT WITH LTC MONTERROSA; MAJ CASERES ENTERED ABOUT MID-DISCUSSION. [REDACTED] NIG

(3) ALL THREE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT WERE IN MORAZAN DEPARTMENT DURING OPERATION "RESCATE", ALTHOUGH MAJOR CASERES APPARENTLY SPENT PERIODS AT THE BATTALION HEADQUARTERS AT SITIO DEL NINO (1348N-8922W) DURING THE OPERATION.

(4) THE TWO HOURS SPENT WITH THESE THREE OFFICERS WAS INTERESTING TO SAY THE LEAST. THE NUANCES, SUBTILITIES AND INDIRECT COMPARISONS USED BY LTC MONTERROSA AND MAJ AZMITIA WERE INTRIGUING. YET THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS REMAIN WITHOUT DEFINITIVE ANSWERS.

(5) RO'S PERSONAL OPINION, AND HE EMPHASIZES "PERSONAL", IS THAT ATACATL BATTALION OR ELEMENTS THEREIN PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON EL MOZOTE. PRECLUDING PERMISSION FROM GENERAL GARCIA, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, DEFINITIVE ANSWERS AS TO THE MISSION, POSITIONS, AND ACTIONS PARTICIPATED IN, OF THE ATACATL BATTALION IN OPERATION "RESCATE" MAY NEVER BE FORTHCOMING.

(6) THIS IR SUPPLEMENTS IR 6 829 0034 82, AND AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 773, DTG 312020Z JAN 82.

[REDACTED] NIG

DEFENSE: (U) APP BY: DENNIS M. DUGGAN, COL, GS, ATTACHE.

(U) REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: N/A

(U) ENCL: N/A

(U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

REVW: FEB 82.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82SAN SA006485

ADP702

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ACTION ARA-16

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 EB-08
NSC-01 NSAE-00 PM-09 MCT-02 SAL-01 SP-02 /060 W
-----000057 050118Z /73

R 041730Z AUG 82
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1023
DDO WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PAN/INTAFF

SECTION 01 OF 08 SAN SALVADOR 6485

NOFORN

E. O. 12356: DECL: 8/4/88
TAGS: PINS, PINT, MILI, ES
SUBJECT: (S) EL SALVADOR MILITARY ASSESSMENT

REF: SAN SALVADOR 2327

1. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AT PRESENT, 29,218 MILITARY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF SALVADOR FACE AN ENEMY OF ABOUT 4,000 FULL-TIME ARMED INSURGENTS. THIS REPRESENTS A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS OF ARMED FORCES STRENGTH AND, IN OUR ESTIMATION, A SLIGHT DECREASE IN SUBVERSIVE NUMBERS DUE TO DESERTIONS AND CASUALTIES. BOTH SIDES

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COUNT SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF FOLLOWERS IN VARIOUS STATES OF READINESS AND ARMAMENT. THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE TO THE ARMED FORCES IS EXPANDING SLIGHTLY AND TO INSURGENTS THROUGH CUBA AND NICARAGUA IS REMAINING STABLE.

3. THE SALVADORAN ECONOMY CONTINUES IN DECLINE ABETTED BY CUMULATIVE SUBVERSIVE DESTRUCTION OF ECONOMIC ASSETS EXCEEDING \$100 MILLION. SUBVERSIVES WERE ABLE TO

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PAGE NO. 1

United States Department of State
Office of FOI, Privacy, & Classification Review
Review Authority: THEODORE HEAVNER
Date: 06/09/94
Case ID: S940034C

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82SAN SA006485

PREVENT VOTING IN LESS THAN FIVE PERCENT OF THE VOTING PLACES OF SALVADOR AND ONLY TWO OF 261 MUNICIPALITIES ARE IN THEIR HANDS AT PRESENT. ALL INDICES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS ARE DOWN IN 1982. HOWEVER, CIVILIANS CONTINUE TO LEAVE EL SALVADOR IN RECORD NUMBERS.

4. THE MORALE OF THE ARMED FORCES REMAINS HIGH WITH OCCASIONAL RUMBLINGS OF DISCONTENT ABOUT SPECIFIC POLICIES AND LEADERS. HALF OF THE CADET LIEUTENANTS TRAINED IN THE U.S. ARE BEING UTILIZED WHILE THE REMAINDER UNDERGO FURTHER TRAINING. THE OPERATION IN MORAZAN IN JUNE ILLUSTRATED BOTH LONG STANDING WEAKNESSES IN THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THREE U.S. -TRAINED BATTALIONS. THE ARMED FORCES REMAIN UNITED BEHIND PRESIDENT MAGAN WITH IMPORTANT ELEMENTS WARY OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CONSTITUTENT ASSEMBLY. DESPITE THIS WARINESS GENERATED BY PERCEIVED THREATS TO U.S. AND CIVILIAN SUPPORT AND SOME DIS-SATISFACTION WITH THE HIGH COMMAND, POSSIBILITIES OF A GOLPE APPEAR SLIM. PROGRESS IS BEING MADE, ALBEIT SLOWLY ON CONTROL OF ABUSES. ARMED FORCES INABILITY TO DEMONSTRATE ITS INCREASING PROFESSIONALISM THROUGH EFFECTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS REMAINS A PROBLEM.

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5. ALL ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM CONTRIBUTED TO THIS QUARTERLY MILITARY ASSESSMENT--THE FIRST SINCE THE MARCH 28 ELECTIONS (REFTEL). END SUMMARY.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND PROGNOSIS: WHILE THE MARCH 28 ELECTIONS AND THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY REPRESENT BOTH A POLITICAL AND A MILITARY VICTORY FOR THE GOES, THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS REMAINS FRAGILE. NONETHELESS, AS OF NOW THE TRENDES ARE TOWARD EVENTUAL SUCCESS FOR THE GOES AND FOR LONG-RANGE U.S. POLICIES.

--SUBVERSIVES DEMONSTRATED DURING THE ELECTIONS, IN AN EARLY MAY OFFENSIVE, AND AGAIN DURING THE MORAZAN OPERATION IN JUNE THE PRESENT LIMITS OF THEIR STRENGTH.

--THE ARMED FORCES CONTINUE TO GROW IN NUMBERS, PROFESSIONALISM AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED FOR CIVILIAN AND U.S. SUPPORT.

--REGIONAL COOPERATION THROUGH THE CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY IS GROWING.

--A PLURALISTIC CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT HAS WEATHERED IT FIRST TUMULTUOUS 60 DAYS AND IS SETTLING IN TO AN HISTORICALLY UNPRECEDENTED RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY.

--THE ECONOMY, TARGET OF THE GUERRILLA PROLONGED WAR, HAS SURVIVED THE WORST BLOWS AGAINST IT DEMONSTRATING A RESILIENCY WHICH LEAVES IT POISED FOR RECOVERY IF SUFFICIENT EXTERNAL PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESOURCES

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82SAN 5A006485

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM B2SAN SA006485

ADP705
[REDACTED]PAGE 01 SAN SA 06485 02 OF 08 042044Z
ACTION ARA-16INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 EB-08
NSC-01 NSAE-00 PM-09 MCT-02 SAL-01 SP-02 /060 W
-----002644 050118Z /73R 041730Z AUG 82
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO C/SECSTATE WASHDC 1024
OOO WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 8
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PAN/INTAFF

[REDACTED] SECTION 02 OF 08 SAN SALVADOR 6485

NOFORN

7. PROGRESS ON THE MILITARY FRONT IN THE NEXT THREE MONTHS IN ESTABLISHING LONGER TERM TRENDS WILL BE MEASURED BY:

- THE ABILITY OF THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND TO UNDERTAKE STRATEGIC PLANNING TO USE ITS EXPANDED RESOURCES TO TAKE AND HOLD OBJECTIVES SELECTED FOR THEIR IMPORTANCE RATHER THAN AS REACTIONS TO SUBVERSIVE INITIATIVES. WE EXPECT ONLY LIMITED PROGRESS.
- THE SUCCESS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN IDENTIFYING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES TO WHICH THE DIVERGENT POLITICAL INTERESTS CAN SUBSCRIBE. WE SEE SOME SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING SUCH A POLITICAL AGENDA.
- DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL PLAN FOR PEACE INCLUDING A MEANINGFUL AMNESTY PROGRAM, SOME MECHANISM FOR RECONCILIATION AND EXPANDED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, AND AN INSTITUTIONAL

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BASE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ADVANCES. WE EXPECT SUCH A PLAN TO EMERGE THOUGH FLAWED BY REALITIES OF PRESENT DAY EL SALVADOR, ELEMENTS BOTH OF THE LESS COMMITTED ARMED INSURGENTS AND THE MORE MODERATE POLITICAL LEFT COULD BE ATTRACTED BY IT.

- DELIVERY OF CONTINUED U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE SUFFICIENT TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT FOR THE ABOVE. WE SEE CONTINUING VULNERABILITY TO A CURTAILMENT OF EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE WHICH WOULD DEVASTATE

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82SAN 5A008485

THE ECONOMY AND UNLEASH LATENT DESTRUCTIVE FORCES WITHIN THE MILITARY AS A CONTINUING DANGER. RISING ANTI-AMERICAN FEELING AS A RESULT OF INEQUITIES IN U.S. CONGRESSIONAL CONDITIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR COMPOUND THIS PROBLEM. EN CONCLUSIONS.

8. PART 1 - CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION

A. LOCATION, SIZE, LOGISTIC SITUATION OF FREINDLY FORCES

AS OF JUNE 1982 THE COMBINED STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES AND PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES WAS 29,218. IN ADDITION, THERE ARE PERHAPS AS MANY AS 80,000 PARA-MILITARY FORCES CONSISTING OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE UNITS, TERRITORIAL FORCES AND OTHER GROUPS IN VARYING STAGES OF READINESS. THE ARMY CONSISTS OF 17,691 PEOPLE ORGANIZED IN 19 DIFFERENT BATTALION-SIZED MANEUVER UNITS, ONE ARTILLERY BRIGADE AND A CAVALRY REGIMENT. THERE ARE 423 NAVY, 754 AIR FORCE, 3,447 NATIONAL GUARD, 4,887 NATIONAL POLICE, AND 2,018 TREASURY POLICE. THE COUNTRY IS DIVIDED INTO SIX MILITARY ZONES. WHILE CRITICAL SHORTAGES OF FIREARMS, SUPPLIES AND MUNITIONS CONTINUE TO PLAGUE THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES, THE ONLY KNOWN CRITICAL SHORTAGE WHICH COULD AFFECT

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SHORT-TERM MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY IS FUEL. THIS PROBLEM WAS CAUSED BY THE RECENT INSURGENT INTERDICTION OF THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND COULD BE REMEDIED BY CONVOYING GASOLINE TRUCKS UNDER MILITARY ESCORT.

B. INSURGENTS

THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF POSTULATES APPROXIMATELY 10,000 GUERRILLAS NOT ALL OF WHOM ARE ARMED AND PUTS TOTAL POTENTIAL SUBVERSIVES, INCLUDING PART-TIME MILITIA AND MASSES OR FOLLOWERS, AT 50,000 PLUS. WE BELIEVE A CASE CAN BE MADE THAT THERE ARE ABOUT 4,000 COMBATANTS AND 5,000 TO 10,000 MILITIA WITH AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF FOLLOWERS. THIS MAY BE SLIGHTLY LOWER THAN THE FIGURE WE UNDERSTAND THE WASHINGTON ANALYTICAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE HAS ADOPTED OF FOUR TO FIVE THOUSAND ARMED COMBATANTS AND 8,000-13,000 MILITIA. OUR PRIMARY REASON FOR A LOWER FIGURES IS THAT GUERRILLA OPERATIONS DO NOT INDICATE HIGHER FIGURES. WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE MORAZAN FIGHTING IN THE FIRST PART OF JULY, BATTLEFIELD COMMANDERS REPORT DECREASING MILITARY EXPERIENCE AMONG THE SUBVERSIVES. PARTICULARLY MENTIONED ARE POOR MOVEMENT AND MANEUVER TECHNIQUES, LACK OF FIRE DISCIPLINE AND INCREASING NUMBERS OF FEMALES AND YOUNG PEOPLE. IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT

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WHILE FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND OF THE BEST TRAINED SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES WERE TIED DOWN IN MORAZAN, SUBVERSIVES WERE UNABLE TO MOUNT A SUSTAINED MILITARY CAMPAIGN ELSEWHERE. THEY CONCENTRATED ON THE SOFTEST OF TARGETS--INTERDICTION HIGHWAYS, BOMBING BUSES, AND ATTACKS ON THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM.

SUBVERSIVES ARE LOCATED THROUGHTOUT THE COUNTRY BUT ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE CENTRAL AND NORTHERN SECTORS PRIMARILY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENTS OF USulután, SAN VICENTE, CUSCATLÁN, CHALATENANGO, AND MORAZAN.

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OUR REDUCED ESTIMATE OF FORCE LEVELS IS BASED ON A VIEW THAT OVERALL STRENGTH HAS DECLINED SOMEWHAT IN THE LAST THREE MONTHS DUE TO CASUALTIES AND DESERTIONS. HOWEVER, THE EVIDENCE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE.

C. THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE TO ARMED FORCES OF SALVADOR
THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE OTHER THAN EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING HAS BEEN PROVIDED ALMOST ENTIRELY BY HONDURAS IN THE FORM OF INTERDICTION OF INFILTRATION FROM NICARAGUA ACROSS THE GULF OF FONSECA AND THE HONDURAS/EL SALVADOR BORDER. RECENTLY, THIS COOPERATION INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY WHEN MULTI-BATTALION HONDURAN FORCES WERE DEPLOYED IN BLOCKING POSITIONS ALONG THE BORDER WITH MORAZAN PROVINCE TO SUPPORT A SALVADORAN OPERATION. DURING THIS OPERATION, HONDURAN AIRCRAFT FLEW RECONNAISSANCE AND STRIKE MISSIONS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER.

OTHER THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE IS AS FOLLOWS:

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1025
DOD WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PAN/INTAFF

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1 NATIONALIST CHINA HAS OFFERED AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF SCHOOL QUOTAS AT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COURSE.
2) VENEZUELA HAS OFFERED 50 QUOTAS FOR CADETS/JUNIOR OFFICERS TO ATTEND THE "CAZADORES" SCHOOL. AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF MEDICS ARE ALSO TO BE TRAINED IN VENEZUELA. THERE ARE CURRENTLY FIVE SALVADORAN CADETS IN VENEZUELAN MILITARY ACADEMIES.

VENEZUELA IS EXPECTED TO SEND A MOBILE TRAINING TEAM FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE TO EL SALVADOR IN JULY.

VENEZUELA HAS DEPLOYED TWO MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS IN SALVADOR WITH APPROXIMATELY 30 INSTRUCTORS TO TRAIN TWO "CAZADORES" LIGHT BATTALIONS AND AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF SALVADORANS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS. THIS IS NOT EXPECTED TO BE AN INCREASE IN END STRENGTH, BUT RATHER TRAINING FOR PERSONNEL/UNITS ALREADY IN SERVICE. WHETHER THESE UNITS WILL RECEIVE ANY EQUIPMENT IS UNKNOWN.

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ALTHOUGH A SMALL NUMBER OF FAL RIFLES HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED IN TO EL SALVADOR FROM VENEZUELA.

3) COLOMBIA IS PROVIDING FOUR OR FIVE QUOTAS FOR LANCERO SCHOOL THIS YEAR.

4) ARGENTINA WILL SELL EL SALVADOR AN UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF 9MM BROWNING PISTOLS, MACHINE PISTOLS, 9MM AMMUNITION, AND .38 CALIBER AMMUNITION. ARGENTINA HAS OFFERED EL SALVADOR ONE HUNDRED MILLION U.S. DOLLARS IN DEFENSE LOANS. EL SALVADOR IS EXPECTED TO DECLINE THIS LOAN DUE TO ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. FIVE SALVADORANS ARE ATTENDING

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AN INTELLIGENCE COURSE IN ARGENTINA.

5) CHILE IS CURRENTLY TRAINING THIRTY-TWO SALVADORANS IN A VARIETY OF SCHOOLS.

6) THERE IS ONE SALVADORAN CADET AT THE PERUVIAN AIR FORCE ACADEMY.

7) THERE ARE SIX SALVADORANS ATTENDING VARIOUS MILITARY SCHOOLS IN PARAGUAY.

8) THERE IS ONE SALVADORAN OFFICER AT THE MILITARY ENGINEERING SCHOOL IN MEXICO.

9) THERE ARE NO KNOWN SIGNIFICANT TRANSFERS OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THIRD COUNTRIES TO EL SALVADOR.

D. THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE TO SUBVERSIVES

THIRD COUNTRY RESUPPLY ASSISTANCE TO THE SUBVERSIVE ELEMENT IN EL SALVADOR DESPITE THE TWO-MONTH LULL FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS HAS SHOWN THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS:

--THERE HAS NOT BEEN A DECREASE IN THE LEVEL OF RESUPPLY ACTIVITY.

--THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF MAINLINE GUERRILLAS WITH M-16, FAL AND G-3 RIFLES.

--THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASE IN THE AMOUNT OF MONEY NEEDED TO RUN GUERRILLA CAMP SYSTEMS.

--THERE HAS BEEN A SEASONAL CHANGE FROM MAINLY SEA TO MAINLY AIR DELIVERIES ALONG WITH A SLIGHT INCREASE IN LAND RESUPPLY.

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--THERE IS A POSSIBLE CONNECTION WITH CUBAN AIR DELIVERY TO NICARAGUA, ILLUSTRATED BY THE INCREASED CUBAN DELIVERIES IN THE WEEKS PRECEDING THE SALVADORAN ELECTIONS, AND THE LEVEL OF ARMS DELIVERIES TO THE SALVADORAN INSURGENCY. THIS OBSERVATION WAS AGAIN MADE DURING THE INCREASED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY AT THE END OF JUNE/BEGINNING OF JULY.

THIRD COUNTRY RESUPPLY ASSISTANCE TO THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR IS STILL BEING CHanneled THROUGH CUBA AND NICARAGUA. SOVIET, CUBAN, VIETNAMESE AND NORTH KOREAN RESUPPLY ASSISTANCE IS NEVER DEIRCELY DELIVERED. RATHER, MATERIEL, ARMAMENTS, FOOD, MEDICINE, AND MONEY IS LAUNDRED EITHER THROUGH CUBA OR INCARAGUA OR, UPON OCCASION, MEXICO. (NOTE: MOST DELIVERIES THROUGH MEXICO ARE DESTINED FOR GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS.)

THIRD COUNTRY RESUPPLY METHODS STILL INVOLVE ALL THREE ROUTES, CONSISTING OF AIR, SEA AND LAND. A PATTERN OF EBB AND FLOW OF RESUPPLY DELIVERIES APPEARS PRIMARILY TO BE TIED TO WEATHER CONDITIONS AND SECONDLY, TO AVAILABILITY OF TRANSPORT VEHICLES. BUT, AN UPSURGE OF DELIVERIES HAS BEEN NOTED ON OCCASION DUE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL REVERSES ON THE SIDE OF THE GUERRILLAS. HUMAINT REPORTING FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR DID DISCUSS NICARAGUAN, CUBAN AND SOVIET REEVALUATION OF RESUPPLY AND SUPPORT EFFORTS FOR THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS AND ITS ATTENDANT GAIN, HOWEVER, HEAVY

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PRESS COVERAGE REGARDING ARMS DELIVERIES TO NICARAGUA MAY HAVE HAD THIS EFFECT. SINCE THE END OF MAY/BEGINNING OF JUNE, RESUPPLY EFFORTS APPEAR TO HAVE RESUMED AT PREVIOUSL LEVELS. DELIVERY PERIODS APPEAR TO BE APRIL THROUGH OCTOBER LARGELY BY AIR, AUGUST THROUGH JANUARY LARGELY BY LAND, JANUARY THROUGH MARCH LARGELY BY SEA. IT MUST BE NOTED THAT AT ANY GIVEN TIME ALL THREE ALL THREE METHODS OF LAND, SEA AND AIR APPEAR TO BE USED IN CONTINUOUS CONSORT. A "WHATEVER IS POSSIBLE/ ATTITUDE SEEMS TO PREVAIL; BUT THE PLANNING FOR WHAT IS AVAILABLE IS DONE TWO TO THREE MONTHS BEFORE



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THE SYSTEM IS CHANGED.

NO NEW LEVEL OF WEAPONRY SOPHISTICATION HAS BEEN INTRODUCED THIS QUARTER. HOWEVER, A RAID ON A SUBVER-SIVE SAFE HOUSE IN SAN SALVADOR IN EARLY JULY NETTED WEAPONS OF RUSSIAN ORIGIN AMONG OTHERS. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW RUSSIAN GRENADES, FUSES AND RPG-2'S FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA, ALL WEAPONRY PREVIOUSLY HAND BEEN OF WESTERN MANUFACTURE.



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THIRD COUNTRY TRAINING OF SALVADORAN INSURGENTS OUTSIDE EL SALVADOR HAS REMAINED AT THE SAME HIGH LEVEL. TRAINING IS PROVIDED IN NICARAGUA, CUBA, MEXICO AND POSSIBLY VIETNAM, TRAINING WITHIN EL SALVADOR, WITHIN THE LAST QUARTER, HAS INCREASED AS INDICATED BY THE EXPANSION OF THE TRAINING CAMPS AND TRAINING FACILITIES: E.G., MORAZAN. THERE HAS BEEN AN INCREASED SPECIALIZATION WITHIN THE FPL TO INCLUDE VANGUARD UNITS AND SPECIAL FORCES UNITS.

THIRD COUNTRY DELIVERIES ARE NOT LARGE. THE DELIVERIES USUALLY AVERAGE BETWEEN FIVE TO EIGHT THOUSAND POUNDS. IF THE MATERIAL IS PARA-DROPPED, IT USUALLY IS IN 100-POUND LOADS. IF THE MATERIAL IS LANDED BY PLANE, IT IS UNKNOWN HOW THE MATERIAL IS

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PACKAGED. AIR DELIVERIES ARE PROBABLY LANDED VERSUS AIR DROPPED. IF THE MATERIAL IS DELIVERED BY BOAT, DELIVERIES CAN BE AS LARGE AS 10,000 POUNDS, BUT IT IS UNKNOWN AS TO THE NUMBER OF BOATS, PANGAS AND FISHING BOATS NEEDED FOR SUCH A DELIVERY. LAND DELIVERIES SINCE THE CRACKDOWN LAST NOVEMBER HAVE BEEN IN EXTREMELY SMALL AMOUNTS; I.E., 7-10 RIFLES.

CURRENTLY, GUERRILLA NEEDS APPEAR TO BE AMMUNITION FOR RIFLES, MORTARS AND THE RPG-2 ROCKET

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LAUNCHERS; MATERIAL TO BUILD EXPLOSIVES, CHLORATE AND COPPER TUBING; SHOES AND MEDICINE. MEDICINE, HOWEVER, IS USUALLY PURCHASED IN SAN SALVADOR. MOST OF THE MAINLINE GUERRILLAS APPEAR TO HAVE M-16, FAL, OR G-3 RIFLES IN FAIR CONDITION. ONLY 45-50 PERCENT OF THE MILITIA APPEAR TO HAVE ANY KIND OF WEAPON AND IT IS USUALLY IN WORN CONDITION. EACH 150-MAN UNIT TRIES TO HAVE A LEAST ONE 81MM MORTAR AND TWO RPG-2 ROCKET LAUNCHERS PER 25 MEN AND ONE SNIPER PER 25 MEN, DEPENDING ON EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY. THIS INDICATES A SOMEWHAT INADEQUATE TONE FOR MAINLINE UNITS.

DUE TO FAILED INSURGENT OPERATIONS DURING THE ELECTIONS AND DEPLETED SUPPLIES, THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN APRIL AND THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF MAY IN DESERTIONS AND A RISE IN MORALE PROBLEMS AND INCREASED FRICTION BETWEEN FACTIONS. NEW PLANS AND RESUPPLY DELIVERIES WERE MADE TO OVERCOME THESE PROBLEMS. EVIDENTLY, BY THE BEGINNING OF JUNE, ADEQUATE RESUPPLY FOR ALL AREAS WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND MORALE AND UNREST WITHIN THE VARIOUS FACTIONS SUBSIDED. THREE-QUARTERS OF THE CURRENT RESUPPLY APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY AIR AND ONE-QUARTER BY LAND. THERE WAS A DISTINCT DROP IN SEA DELIVERIES AFTER APRIL. HOWEVER, A FEW HAVE BEEN NOTED.

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GUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN JUNE INDICATE ADEQUATE SUPPLY LEVELS TO SUPPORT THE ERP TARGETS OF PARALYZING LOCAL TRANSPORTATION AND THE FPL TARGETS OF GOVERNMENT ELECTRICAL, TELEPHONE AND MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. ADEQUATE SUPPLIES ALSO APPEAR TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT NEW GUERRILLA TACTICS OF ATTACKING AND MANEUVERING RATHER THAN ATTACKING AND WITHDRAWING. IF THE GUERRILLAS CANNOT MAINTAIN THESE SUPPLY LEVELS, THEN THEY PROBABLY WILL HAVE TO REVERT BACK TO THEIR PREVIOUS TACTICS.

9. PART II - IMPACT OF MILITARY SITUATION ON CIVILIAN ACTIVITY
A. THE ECONOMY

ATTACKS ON THE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE HAVE BEEN MOST SEVERE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SAN VICENTE AND THE AREA EAST OF THE LEMPA RIVER. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE AREAS ACCOUNT FOR ALMOST HALF OF THE SALVADORAN TERRITORY BUT LESS THAN A QUARTER OF THE NATION'S ECONOMY. IN RECENT WEEKS, SAN SALVADOR HAS ALSO SEEN A RENEWAL OF URBAN TERRORISM, DIRECTED CHIEFLY AGAINST THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM AND THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM. ATTACKS DURING THIS PERIOD HAVE BEEN, ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY, HARASSING ACTIONS IN WHICH ONLY THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF MANY PINPRICKS IS IMPORTANT.

NATIONWIDE, FROM APRIL 1 TO JUNE 30, SOME 77 ELECTRICAL FACILITIES WERE DAMAGED OR DESTROYED, INCLUDING 58 ELECTRICAL TOWERS WHICH COST SLIGHTLY

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
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MORE THAN \$800,000 TO REPAIR ON A PROVISIONAL BASIS. SINCE AUGUST 1980, SOME 348 ELECTRICAL TOWERS HAVE BEEN DAMAGED OR DESTROYED, WITH AN ESTIMATED COST OF \$4.7 MILLION TO RETURN THEM TO SERVICE. MORE IMPORTANTLY, AS ATTACKS ON THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM ISOLATE AREAS FROM THE PRIMARY GENERATING SOURCE, SECONDARY GENERATING FACILITIES MUST BE UTILIZED. WHILE THE PRIMARY GENERATING SOURCES ARE HYDROELECTRIC OR GEOTHERMAL, THE SECONDARY SOURCES ARE PETROLEUM BASED. FROM APRIL 1 TO JUNE 30, RELIANCE ON PETROLEUM-BASED ELECTRICITY



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INCREASED THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE ENERGY COST TO EL SALVADOR BY \$1.7 MILLION. SINCE AUGUST 1980, RELIANCE ON OTHERWISE UNNECESSARY PETROLEUM-BASED ENERGY HAS INCREASED EL SALVADOR'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE COSTS BY \$8.5 MILLION. INCLUDING THE INDIRECT COST OF UTILIZING PETROLEUM-BASED ENERGY, THE PRICE TAG FOR LEFTIST DESTRUCTION OF THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM FROM APRIL 1ST TO JUNE 30TH WAS \$2.6 MILLION; CUMULATIVELY FROM AUGUST 1980, THE PRICE TAG WAS \$13.6 MILLION, NOT INCLUDING THE COST OF PERMANENT REPAIR OF TOWERS WHICH HAVE BEEN RESTORED TO SERVICE ON A PROVISIONAL BASIS ONLY.

THE CHIEF IMPACT OF ATTACKS ON THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM IS NOT THE HIGH COST OF REPAIR. IT IS THE INDIRECT INTERRUPTION OF PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES IN MAJOR PARTS OF THE COUNTRY. THE DEPARTMENT OF SAN MIGUEL, HOME OF THE NATION'S THIRD LARGEST CITY AND


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AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PAN/INTAFF

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A CENTER FOR COTTON, LIVESTOCK, DAIRY PRODUCTS, AND LIGHT INDUSTRY, WAS WITHOUT POWER FOR 126 DAYS IN 1981. AS OF JULY 7, SAN MIGUEL HAD BEEN WITHOUT POWER FOR 63 DAYS IN 1982. THE DEPARTMENTS OF USULUTAN AND LA UNION, CENTERS FOR COTTON GROWING, FISHING, AND LIGHT INDUSTRY, SUFFERED SIMILAR PROBLEMS.

LEFTIST ATTACKS ON THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM TAKE ON AN ADDED SIGNIFICANCE WHEN VIEWED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THEIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, ESPECIALLY URBAN TRANSPORTATION IN SAN SALVADOR AND INTERDEPARTMENTAL TRANSPORTATION IN THE EASTERN SECTION OF THE COUNTRY. THE GUERRILLAS' CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE FLOW OF TRAFFIC AND INTERRUPT IT ALMOST AT WILL HAS ALLOWED THEM TO CUT OFF ALMOST COMPLETELY THE FLOW OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, ESPECIALLY

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FUEL OIL, TO THE EAST. THUS, TEMPORARY GENERATORS, ALWAYS A SECOND BEST SOLUTION, HAVE BEEN EVEN LESS ABLE TO MAKE UP FOR THE INTERRUPTIONS IN ELECTRICAL FLOW THROUGH THE MAIN POWER GRID. THIS HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY CRITICAL FOR HOSPITALS AND WATER PUMPING STATIONS, AS WELL AS FOR FACTORIES, DAIRIES, COTTON AND COFFEE PROCESSING PLANTS, COLD STORAGE FACILITIES FOR SEAFOOD PRODUCTS, AND LIGHT INDUSTRY.

DURING THE APRIL TO JUNE QUARTER, SOME 33 BUSES

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AND EIGHT OTHER VEHICLES WERE DESTROYED OR DAMAGED WITHIN THE CITY LIMITS OF SAN SALVADOR. NATIONWIDE, DURING THAT SAME PERIOD, AND ADDITIONAL 74 BUSES WERE DESTROYED OR DAMAGED. THE HAZARDS OF TRAVEL TO THE EAST HAVE CAUSED MAJOR TRANSPORT COMPANIES VIRTUALLY TO SUSPEND OPERATIONS IN THAT AREA, WITH ADVERSE RESULTS FOR ALL ECONOMIC ACTIVITY THERE, ESPECIALLY IN THE SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM AND THE SHIPMENT OF SEAFOOD PRODUCTS BY LAND TO GUATEMALAN PORTS ON THE CARIBBEAN.

ARMED LEFTIST ACTIVITY CONTINUES TO TAKE A HEAVY TOLL ON AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. ESPECIALLY IN THE COTTON GROWING AREA OF USULUTAN AND THE COFFEE GROWING AREAS OF SAN VICENTE AND SAN MIGUEL, TERRORIST ACTIVITY HAS FORCED A MAJOR REDUCTION, AND IN SOME CASES A COMPLETE HALT, TO PRODUCTION. FORTY PHASE I COOPS, AMONG THE LARGEST AND POTENTIALLY MOST PRODUCTIVE FARMS IN THE COUNTRY, STILL ARE UNABLE TO RESUME OPERATIONS BECAUSE OF THEIR INABILITY TO BRING IN INPUTS AND TECHNICAL ADVISORS, BECAUSE THEY CANNOT FREELY TRANSPORT THEIR OUTPUT, AND BECAUSE LOCAL GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES DIRECTLY THREATEN WORK IN THE FIELDS.

ESTIMATES OF TOTAL LEFTIST DAMAGE TO THE ECONOMY, INCLUDING DIRECT DAMAGE TO ECONOMIC ASSETS AND THE

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INDIRECT DAMAGE OF IMPEDING PRODUCTION, ARE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. CUMULATIVE LEFTIST DESTRUCTION OF ECONOMIC ASSETS EXCEEDS \$100 MILLION, COMBINING LEFTIST DESTRUCTION OF ASSETS, NORMAL DEPRECIATION, AND THE LOW LEVEL OF INVESTMENT CAUSED BY UNCERTAINTY AS TO THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE COURSE AND THE SECURITY OF PRODUCTIVE OPERATIONS, EL SALVADOR HAS HAD A NEGATIVE REAL NET INVESTMENT. THAT IS, THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF THE NATION HAS DECLINED SHARPLY IN ABSOLUTE TERMS OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS.

B. MUNICIPALITIES IN CONFLICT

THE ESAF'S CURRENT CONCEPT FOR DEFENDING ITS POPULATION CALLS FOR A STATIC DEFENSE WITH LOCAL PATROLLING IN SELECTED CITIES, TOWN AND VILLAGES. ALTHOUGH APPROXIMATELY 50 PERCENT OF THE ARMED FORCES IS TIED UP IN THIS TASK, THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH TROOPS TO SPREAD AROUND IN EVERY SMALL RURAL TOWN. THEREFORE, IN THE COUNTRYSIDE THE DETACHMENTS TEND TO BE SMALL, AND THE GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OVERRUN AND SEIZE A PARTICULAR TOWN FOR SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. COMMITMENT OF SUFFICIENT ESAF TROOPS HAS ALWAYS RESULTED IN THE TOWN BEING RECAPTURED. RECENT EXAMPLES INCLUDE PERQUIN AND SAN FERNANDO IN MORAZAN. EL CARRIZAL AND OJOS DE AGUA, TWO OTHER TOWNS CAPTURED IN JUNE, ARE STILL UNDER GUERRILLA CONTROL SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ESAF HAS NOT YET COMMITTED ASSETS TO RESEIZE THEM.

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URBAN TERRORISM. INCIDENTS IN THE LARGER CITIES (E.G., SAN SALVADOR, SAN MIGUEL, ETC.) HAVE BEEN PRIMARILY DIRECTED AT THE INFRASTRUCTURE: PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, HIGH TENSION CABLES, AND THE TELEPHONE BOXES, THROUGH POLICE HAVE RECENTLY BECOME TARGETS. ASSASSINATIONS OF UNPROMINENT INDIVIDUALS ARE ALSO A COMMON OCCURENCE. RECENTLY THERE HAVE BEEN UNCONFIRMED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS THAT THE INSURGENTS INTEND TO RENEW URBAN INSURGENCY ON A LARGE SCALE.

THE ONLY SYSTEMATIC TEST OF GOVERNMENT VS. INSURGENT CONTROL THROUGHOUT SALVADOR TOOK PLACE

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AT THE TIME OF THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS WHICH THE GUERRILLAS MADE A MAJOR EFFORT TO PREVENT. AT THAT TIME, THE GOVERNMENT WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY SO THAT VOTING TOOK PLACE IN ALL BUT APPROXIMATELY 20 OF THE MORE THAN 500 VOTING PLACES IN EL SALVADOR.

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AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
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C. VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS
ALL INDICES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS HAVE
SHOWED A DOWNWARD TREND SINCE THE BEGINNING OF 1982
THOUGH THE PATTERN HAS BEEN ERRATIC. THERE HAS
TENDED TO BE AN UPSURGE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIAN
AT TIMES OF HEAVY INSURGENT ACTIVITY, PARTICULARLY
PRIOR TO THE ELECTION. PRESS REPORTS OF VIOLENT
CIVILIAN DEATHS NOW AVERAGE APPROXIMATELY 50 PER WEEK
AS COMPARED TO 100 AT THE END OF 1981 AND AS MANY AS
200 EARLIER IN 1981.

URBAN TERRORISM HAS NOT BEEN DIRECTED TOWARD
INFLECTING CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. FOR EXAMPLE, SINCE
JULY 1981 THERE HAVE BEEN 234 BOMB EXPLOSIONS WITHIN
THE CITY OF SAN SALVADOR. THESE ARE BROKEN DOWN AS

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FOLLOWS: 83 BUSES, SEVEN ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS, 44
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND 100 BUSINESSES OR PRIVATE
PROPERTIES. OUT OF THESE 234 INCIDENTS ONLY TEN DEATHS
WERE REPORTED, INCLUDING THREE POLICEMEN.

FOREIGNERS HAVE NOT BEEN THE OBJECTS OF
SPECIFIC ATTACKS DURING THE CURRENT WAVE OF URBAN
TERRORISM THOUGH THE PARAGUAYAN AMBASSADOR'S VEHICLE
WAS BOMBED ON JUNE 30, 1982. INFORMATION REGARDING
THIS BOMBING INCICATE IT WAS ONE OF OPPORTUNITY RATHER THAN A

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 82SAN SA006485

PLANNED ATTACK. THE ONLY OTHER INCIDENT WAS THE THROWING OF A GRENADE INTO THE GARDEN OF THE VENEZUELAN EMBASSY IN FEBRUARY.

D. POPULATION TRENDS

VISA FIGURES INDICATE SALVADORANS HAVE BEEN LEAVING THE COUNTRY IN RECORD NUMBERS. WE PROCESSED 8,688 IMMIGRANT VISAS CASES IN FY 81 AND EXPECT AT LEAST 11,000 IN FY 82. IN FY 81, 43,786 NON-IMMIGRANT VISA APPLICATIONS WERE PROCESSED, AND WE EXPECT 50,000 IN FY 82. WE ARE SEEING AN INCREASING NUMBER OF ADJUSTMENTS OF STATUS AS NIV HOLDERS OPT TO STAY IN THE U.S. RATHER THAN RETURN TO EL SALVADOR. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION CONTINUES AT HIGH LEVELS WITH PERHAPS ONE-HALF MILLION SALVADORANS LIVING IN THE U.S. WHILE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO ESTIMATE THE OVERALL REFUGEE POPULATION OUTSIDE OF EL SALVADOR, IT MAY TOTAL AS MANY AS 800,000. THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY INCREASE IN PERSONS APPLYING FOR POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE U.S. DURING FY 82. ON THE OTHER HAND, RECENT FIGURES PROVIDED BY THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR INDICATE THAT THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT IS NOW ISSUING FEWER PASSPORTS THAN DURING 1981.

THE GOES POPULATION PROJECTION FOR 1982 IS 4.8

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MILLION. LIMITED VITAL STATISTICS WOULD INDICATE THAT THERE HAS BEEN A SLIGHT DECLINE IN POPULATION GROWTH RATE OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS. THE DISPLACED PERSONS ESTIMATE FOR JUNE 1982 IS 182,000, DOWN FROM A HIGH OF 225,000 IN APRIL AND FROM 212,000 AT THE END OF 1981. THIS IS A RESULT OF REFINED CENSUS TECHNIQUES AND A REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL CONFLICTIVE AREAS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE ALLOWING THE RETURN OF SOME DISPLACED PERSONS TO THEIR PLACE OF ORIGIN. THE U.S. CITIZEN POPULATION SHOWED AN INCREASE TO 1200 DURING FY 81 AFTER SHOWING A DECREASE FOR TWO YEARS RUNNING.

10. PART III- PROFESSION OF ARMED FORCES
A. LEADERSHIP, COHESIVENESS OF OFFICER CORPS,
ABSORPTION OF U.S.-TRAINED OFFICERS

THE MORAG OF (#)
VGRADE AND JUNIOR OFFICERS HIGHLY MOTIVATED AND PREPARED FOR THE LONG HAUL.

DURING THE LATTER WEEKS OF THE QUARTER SOME RUMBLINGS OF DISCONTENT HAVE BEEN SURFACING. AS THE EUPHORIA OF THE SUCCESSFUL MARCH 1982 ELECTIONS WEARS OFF, MANY OFFICERS AT ALL LEVEL ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE JULY CERTIFICATION AND BEYOND. THE QUESTION IS: WILL EL SALVADOR BECOME ANOTHER NICARAGUA, ABANDONED BY THE U.S. AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE?

A BRIEF SURGE OF DISCONTENT SURFACED IN JUNE

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WHEN IN THE FACE OF THE LOSS OF A BRIGADE COMMANDER AND THE SUB-SECRETARY OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MANY OFFICERS, IN THEIR FRUSTRATION, BLAMED THESE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE LACK OF LEADERSHIP BY THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE WHO WAS VIEWED AS TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH POLITICAL MANEUVERING TO PROSECUTE THE WAR. WITH THE WIND-DOWN OF OPERATIONS RESCATE THIS CRITICISM HAS SUBSIDED, HOWEVER.

INSOFAR AS THE ABSORPTION OF U.S. TRAINED OFFICERS IS CONCERNED, THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS AT ALL

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WITH THOSE ASSIGNED TO THE THREE QUICK-REACTION BATTALIONS, THEY CONTINUE TO DO WELL IN THE FIELD AND ARE HIGHLY PRIZED BY THEIR COMMANDERS. HOWEVER, HALF OF THE CADET LIEUTENANTS ARE SERVING IN ALL DEPARTMENTS IN ALL THREE SERVICES, WHILE THE REMAINDER RECEIVE ADDITIONAL TRAINING AT THE MILITARY SCHOOL. EVENTUALLY BOTH GROUPS WILL ROTATE. THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE FIELD. IN AN ARMY SORELY LACKING IN JUNIOR OFFICER LEADERSHIP, DEPARTMENTAL AND DETACHMENT COMMANDERS HAVE NOT ALWAYS USED THESE HIGHLY-TRAINED ASSETS WELL. IN SOME INSTANCES THEY ARE USED TO TRAIN RECRUITS, WHILE IN OTHERS THEY RUN GUARD DETAILS. SOME RESENTMENT OF THESE

NOTE BY OC/T: (#) GARBLE/OMISSION PARA 10. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 02SAN SA008485

ANALYSIS OF OPERATION RESCATE IN MORAZAN FROM JUNE 5 UNTIL JULY 2, 1982. U.S. TRAINERS WORKING SPECIFICALLY WITH THE ARMED FORCES DIRECTORATES OF INTELLIGENCE AND OF OPERATIONS BELIEVE MANY OF THESE PROBLEMS HAVE WORKABLE SOLUTIONS AND HAVE FOUND A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF STAFF OFFICERS TO ADDRESS THEM. ALTHOUGH MUCH REMAINS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED AT THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, THE SIGNIFICANT COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEMS APPEAR TO BE AT THE BRIGADE LEVEL AND WILL REQUIRE FURTHER ATTENTION.

C. UTILIZATION OF U.S. EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING, INCLUDING PERFORMANCE OF U.S.-TRAINED RAPID REACTION FORCES
LACK OF AN ADEQUATE TRAINING BASE, THE RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ARMED FORCES, A SHORTAGE OF TRAINED OFFICERS AT BRIGADE AND BATTALION STAFF LEVEL, AND DAILY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS CONTINUE TO HAMPER THE EFFECTIVE INTEGRATION AND UTILIZATION OF U.S.-PROVIDED EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING. THESE WEAKNESSES ARE RECOGNIZED BY THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF, AND THE D-3 IS ATTEMPTING TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION. CONSIDERABLE EFFORT IS BEING EXPENDED TO REPRODUCE THE TRAINING MATERIAL, MANUALS, ETC. THAT HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO THE

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U.S. TRAINED UNITS AND PERSONNEL. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING DISSEMINATED TO THE REMAINDER OF THE ARMED FORCES. MEANWHILE, THE NON-U.S. TRAINED UNITS WILL REMAIN WEAK IN THE AREAS OF SMALL UNIT TACTICS, PATROLLING, AIR-MOBILE AND NIGHT OPERATIONS, WEAPONS TRAINING AND THE EFFECTIVE USE OF TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS. THE D-3 VIEWS CONTINUED U.S. TRAINING, BOTH IN AND OUT OF COUNTRY, AS THE LONG TERM SOLUTION.

THE U.S.-TRAINED UNITS ARE PERFORMING WELL. THE THREE RAPID REACTION BATTALIONS, ATACATL, BELLOSO AND ATONAL, CARRY THE MAJOR LOAD IN THE OPERATIONS THEY PARTICIPATE IN. DURING SIX OF THE LAST SEVEN WEEKS, THESE UNITS HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN ALMOST CONSTANT COMBAT OPERATIONS WITH HEAVY FIGHTING INVOLVED. THEIR MORALE AND COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS REMAINS HIGH. DURING THE RECENT OPERATION IN NORTHERN MORAZAN PROVINCE, THE GOVERNMENT WAS ABLE TO TURN THE TIDE AND GAIN THE INITIATIVE ONLY AS A RESULT OF THE COORDINATED ACTIONS OF THE THREE BATTALIONS. LEADERSHIP, COMMAND AND CONTROL, AND TACTICAL TECHNIQUES IN THESE THREE UNITS GREATLY SURPASSES THAT FOUND IN OTHER UNITS. DURING THE MORAZAN OPERATION, AIR GROUND OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED WITH SOME EFFECTIVENESS, AND THE A-37 PACKAGE WAS EMPLOYED IN A ROLE SIMILAR TO THAT USED BY U.S. FORCES.

A MAJOR WEAKNESS THAT REMAINS IS THE FAILURE TO UTILIZE THE LIMITED AIRMOBILE CAPABILITY TO AIRLIFT

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ADP709

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ACTION ARA-16

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 EB-08
NSC-01 NSAE-00 PM-09 MCT-02 SAL-01 SP-02 /060 W
-----010064 050120Z /73

R 041730Z AUG 82
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1029
DDO WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PAN/INTAFF

SECTION 07 OF 08 SAN SALVADOR 6485

"GRINGO-TRAINED HOTSHOTS" HAS BEEN RECEIVED AS WELL.

B. FUNCTIONING OF COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL HEADQUARTERS COMMAND
CAPABILITY CONTINUES TO IMPROVE (ALBEIT AT TIMES SLOWLY)
AND, PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANTLY, THEY REMAIN OPEN TO
SUGGESTIONS AND CHANGE. THEIR GREATEST SHORTCOMING
STILL LIES IN THEIR TENDENCY TO REACT TO INSURGENT
INITIATIVES RATHER THAN TAKE THE OFFENSIVE. THE LATES
EPISODES IN CHALATENANGO AND MORAZAN WERE AMPL
EVIDENCE OF THE FOREGOING. A MAJOR SHORTCOMING LIES
BETWEEN HEADQUARTES AND THE SIX BRIGADE COMMANDERS.
THE BRIGADE COMMANDERS PLAN AND EXECUTE OPERATIONS
OFTEN WITHOUT PRECOGNIZANCE BY THE HIGH COMMAND. THIS
FAILURE HAS CREASTED SITUATIONS WHERE THE HIGH COMMAND
MUST ATTEMPT TO "CATCH UP" TO THE OPERATIONS IN TERMS
OF TACTICAL SUPPORT, LOGISTICS, AND INTELLIGENCE.

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THE PROPENSITY FOR THE BRIGADE COMMANDERS TO TAKE
UNILATERAL ACTION THAT ULTIMATELY IMPACTS ELSEWHERE HAS
RESULTED IN POORLY PLANNED, EXECUTED AND SUPPORTED
OPERATIONS, HAS DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED
COMBAT CASUALTIES AND EQUIPMENT LOSS, AND PROVIDED
THE INSURGENT WITH A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PROPAGANDA
ADVANTAGE. WE HAVE PROVIDED BY SEPTEL A DETAILED
CRITIQUE OF WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE AREAS FOR POTENTIAL
IMPROVEMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES AS WLL AS A BRIEF

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TEXT OF TELEGRAM 825AN SA006485

TROOPS DIRECTLY INTO COMBAT OPERATIONS. BRIGADE COMMANDERS AND THEIR STAFFS PLAN AND CONDUCT ALL COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS. THEY USE THE AIR-MOBILE ASSETS PIECEMEAL, AND MAINLY FOR RESUPPLY AND MEDICAL EVACUATION PURPOSES. ALSO CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROBLEM IS THE FACT THAT THE EXISTING HELICOPTERS ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS ON A DAILY BASIS TO AIRLIFT MORE THAN A PLATOON AT A TIME. IN JULY 1982 THERE WERE AN AVERAGE OF 32 MILITARY TRAINERS IN COUNTRY. THE AVERAGE OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS HAS BEEN 40. WE FIND THESE

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NUMBERS ADEQUATE THOUGH OCCASIONAL TEMPORARY SURGES PRESS AGAINST THE CEILING OF 55. THERE WOULD BE FEWER OPERATING PROBLEMS IF THE CEILING WERE OBSERVED ON A BASIS OF AVERAGES RATHER THAN ON AN ABSOLUTE BASIS.

D. CIVILIAN/MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

THE ARMED FORCES IS THE TRADITIONAL PIVOTAL ELEMENT IN SALVADORAN POLITICS. THROUGH THREAT OR ACTUAL USE OF FORCE, THE MILITARY HAS HISTORICALLY DETERMINED DEGREE OF CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE OUTCOME OF TRANSITIONS IN NATIONAL POLITICS. THIS WAS PROVEN ONCE AGAIN BOTH IN THEIR DECISION NOT TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE MARCH ELECTIONS AND LATER TO INTERVENE DECISIVELY IN DETERMINING THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW PROVISIONAL

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ACTION ARA-16

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 EB-08
NSC-01 NSAE-00 PM-09 MCT-02 SAL-01 SP-02 /060 W
-----010311 050120Z /73

R 041730Z AUG 82
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1030
DDO WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HTS PAN/INTAFF

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GOVERNMENT. THE HIGH COMMAND HAS CONTINUED TO ACT UNEQUIVOCALLY WHEN IT SAW ITS OWN INTERESTS THREATENED. THEY BOTH PUBLICLY COUNTERED THE ACTION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY ON AGRARIAN REFORM THROUGH A MAJOR SHOW OF SUPPORT FOR IT AND PRIVATELY AND QUIETLY SCUTTLED D'AUBUISSON'S AMNESTY PROPOSAL. RECENT TRIPS BY THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT TO PANAMA AND ALLEGATIONS THAT D'AUBUISSON HAS ENTERED INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FMLN AND CUBA HAVE MADE THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND EVEN MORE WARY OF HIM AND DETERMINED TO EXERCISE CONTROL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE MAINTAINED AN EXCELLENT RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT MAGANA AND CONTINUE TO GIVE HIM THEIR SUPPORT. ANXIETY ABOUT THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT IS MOST FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED BY THE REFORMIST OFFICERS CENTERED AROUND

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THE MILITARY SCHOOL CLASSES OF 1963 AND 1964. THEY EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE REVOLUTION OF OCTOBER 1979 WILL BE THWARTED BY A RIGHTIST ASSEMBLY AN AN INEFFECTUAL EXECUTIVE. HOWEVER, THE ABILITY TO TURN DISATISFACTION INTO A GOLPE DE ESTADO IS LIMITED. THEY HAVE BEEN THE STRONGEST ADVOCATES FOR KEEPING THE MILITARY OUT OF POLITICS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE RECENT ELECTIONS. THEREFORE, KNOWING FULL WELL THE IMPACT A MOVE AGAINST THE

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CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY LEADERSHIP WOULD HAVE ON WORLD OPINION, THEIR ABILITY TO MOVE IN THAT DIRECTION IS SUBSCRIBED. LIKEWISE, THEIR RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT MAGANA, IN LIEU OF A CIVILIAN ALTERNATIVE TO HIM, COMPELS THEM TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE CIVILIAN LEADER PUT FORWARD BY THE VOTE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDERS THEMSELVES. THEIR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE HIGH COMMAND COULD POTENTIALLY LEADE TO A MOVE AGAINST GENERAL GARCIA BUT THERE IS NOT INDICATION THAT THEIR DISSATISFACTION IS SUCH THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO RALLY AROUND AN ALTERNATIVE TO HIM UNLESS, PERHAPS, COL. FLORES LIMA SHOULD SHIFT HIS POSTURE CONSIDERABLY.

THE ANALYSIS CONTAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION FOR JULY 1982 DEMONSTRATES THAT THE MILITARY HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS ON HALTING ABUSES ABAINST CIVILIANS, BOTH REDUCING THE NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS AND SUBMITTING EVER MORE OF THEIR OWN, INCLUDING OFFICERS, TO CIVILIAN JUSTICE. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS CHANGED ATTITUDE HAS EXTENDED TO A REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION WHICH ACTUALLY APPEARS TO BE ON THE RISE AMONG THE MILITARY. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE U.S., THE CHURCH, THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS, AND THE ICRC ARE SUBJECT TO A CRUCIAL

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LIMITATION--THE PRESSURES THEY BRING TO BEAR ARE EXTERNAL TO THE ARMED FORCES ITSELF. THERE IS NO WAY OF BEING CERTAIN TO WHAT DEGREE PERSUASION OR COERCION HAVE IN REALITY CHANGED THE ORIENTATION OF THE MILITARY TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES VIS-A-VIS ELIMINATION OF THE ENEMY. HOWEVER, TO AN INCREASING DEGREE THE MILITARY ZONE COMMANDERS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR PROSECUTING THE WAR TALK AND, TO A LIMITED EXTENT, ACT AS IF THEY UNDERSTAND THAT THEY MUST WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IF THEY ARE TO WIN THE WAR.

E. ARMED FORCES PUBLIC RELATIONS

THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES PUBLIC RELATIONS APPARATUS, PARTICULARLY THE PRESS COMMITTEE OF THE ARMED FORCES, IS TERRIBLE. THE GOOD NEWS GETS OUT SLOWLY AND IN PIECEMEAL FASHION, AND THE BAD NEWS IS ALMOST NEVER REVEALED THROUGH OFFICIAL SOURCES--THUS GIVING AN INVESTIGATIVE (I.E., SENSATIONALIST) CAST TO COVERAGE OF UNFAVORABLE EVENTS. THE MILITARY HAS GIVEN LITTLE PRIORITY TO SETTING UP AN EFFECTIVE MECHANISM FOR DEALING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. COPREFA (THE ARMED FORCES PRESS COMMITTEE) IS CURRENTLY WELL SUITED TO RECEIVE INFORMATION TO DISTRIBUTE, TO DENY REQUESTS OF VARIOUS SORTS, AND TO KEEP THE PRESS AWAY FROM THE "REAL ARMY." THERE IS NOT INDICATION THAT

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COPREFA KNOWS MORE THAN IT SAYS, IS ASKED ITS OPINION ON HOW TO HANDLE A SITUATION, VIEWS THE PRESS AS ANYTHING BUT AN ADVERSARY TO BE CONTAINED, OR HAS ANYTHING MORE THAN A CURSORY KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBSTANTIVE OR TECHNICAL NEEDS OF A FOREIGN JOURNALIST. THE COMBINATION OF THEIR HANDLING OF THE PRESS ALONG WITH THE GENUINE FAILINGS OF THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES CONTINUE TO PLAQUE EFFORTS TO WIN WORLD SUPPORT FOR THE SALVADORAN POSITION. ONLY PROGRESS IN BRINGING ABOUT THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES IS

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LIKELY TO HAVE ANY REAL IMPACT ON RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM BUT INCREASING ATTENTION MUST BE PLACED ON PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE INFORMATION EFFORT ALONG WITH THE OTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES PERFORMANCE.
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EXHIBIT E

(31)

EXCISE

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

AM: DB20326-0139

CONFIDENTIAL

 PAGE 01 TEGUCI 05150 221702Z
 ACTION ARA-16

 INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 CODE-00
 M-01 IO-15 MSCE-00 MSAE-00 SSO-00 SY-05 HA-06
 L-03 PM-09 PK-01 MCT-02 OMB-01 INRE-00 RP-10
 ICAE-00 SYE-00 SP-02 SR-04 SPRS-02 /098 W

 -----270164 221706Z /44
 O R 221631Z JUN 82
 FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8585
 YFO AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
 MEMBASSY MANAGUA
 AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
 AMEMBASSY MEXICO
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PH
 USMISSION-USUN NEW YORK
 USMISSION GENEVA

 DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
 REVIEWED BY ET. LONG DATE 1/25/83
 RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE
 TS AUTH. REASON(S)
 ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
 DECLASSIFIED ☐ RELEASABLE ☐
 RELEASE DENIED ☒ IN PART
 PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS B + a 3.9

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 5150

 EO 12065: GDS 6/22/88 (SHAW, DAVID) OR-P
 TAGS: SHUM SREF MILI HO ES
 SUBJ: ANOTHER SUMPUL RIVER MASSACRE CLAIMED

REF: TEGUCIGALPA 4906

 1. (U) IN A PAID ADVERTISEMENT IN LEFT-LEADING DAILY TIEMPO JUNE
 21, THE NATIONAL COORDINATOR OF SOLIDARITY WITH THE SALVADORAN
 PEOPLE (ENSPS) CHARGED THAT ON JUNE 12, 300 SALVADORANS WERE
 MURDERED AS THEY TRIED TO CROSS THE SUMPUL RIVER TO TAKE REFUGE
 IN HONDURAS. THE AD CLAIMS THAT DELEGATES FROM INTERNATIONAL
 AGENCIES IN MESA GRANDE WERE ABLE TO REACH THE ZONE OF THE
 INCIDENT, VERIFY ITS DIMENSIONS AND, DESPITE THE MILITARY CORDON,
 LEND PROTECTION TO THE FEW SURVIVORS. THE ADVERTISEMENT DOES NOT
 MAKE CLEAR WHETHER THE SALVADORAN OR HONDURAN ARMIES PERPETRATED


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THE ALLEGED INCIDENT, COLLUSION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES

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ARMIES IS ALSO ALLEGED IN THE RECENT OPERATIONS IN CHALATENANGO.



WALKER

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ACTION ARA-16

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 NSC-01
NSAE-00 SY-06 HA-08 PM-09 MCT-02 SP-02 /065 W
-----277140 151904Z /44

R 151737Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3838
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAE JOSE
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

RELEASED IN FULL

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Oscar Olson, Senior
Reviewer

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 SAN SALVADOR 00436

NOFORN DISSIMINATION

THIS ASSESSMENT IS BEING TRANSMITTED IN TWO SEPARATE
CABLES. PART 1 OF 2 FOLLOWS.

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, MILI, ES
SUBJECT: (U) EL SALVADOR MILITARY ASSESSMENT (AUGUST --
- DECEMBER 1982)

REF: 82 SAN SALVADOR 6485

1. S--ENTIRE TEXT.

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2. SUMMARY: THE ARMED FORCES/SECURITY FORCES OF EL
SALVADOR GREW BY 8,582 PEOPLE DURING 1982 TO A TOTAL OF
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31,757 WHILE ARMED INSURGENT STRENGTH REMAINED RELATIVELY
STABLE AT 4 TO 5 THOUSAND, ACCORDING TO OUR BEST ESTIMATE.
EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO BOTH SIDES CONTINUED AT HIGH LEVELS
WITH THE UNITED STATES FOLLOWED BY VENEZUELA PROVIDING THE
BULK OF ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT WHILE CUBA AND NICA-
RAGUA PLACED INCREASING RELIANCE IN THE LATTER MONTHS OF
THE YEAR ON THE USE OF AIRPLANES AND HELICOPTERS TO SUPPLY
INSURGENT FORCES. CASUALTY FIGURES ON BOTH SIDES WERE
HIGH THROUGHOUT THE LATTER HALF OF 1982, THOUGH NOT AP-
PROACHING THE LEVELS OF THE MARCH ELECTIONS. ACCOMPANYING

THE 37 PERCENT INCREASE IN ARMED FORCES NUMBERS OVER THE FULL YEAR THERE WAS A 15 PERCENT INCREASE IN KIA AND A 27 PERCENT INCREASE IN WIA. A MAJOR OFFENSIVE LAUNCHED IN OCTOBER BY THE GUERRILLAS WHICH CONTINUED INTO NOVEMBER DEMONSTRATED THEIR STILL CONSIDERABLE STRENGTH AND THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUING RELIANCE ON LARGE SCALE SWEEP OPERATIONS AS A COUNTER-MEASURE. THIS WAS DESPITE SOME SUCCESSES BY THE GOVERNMENT UTILIZING SMALL SCALE UNIT TACTICS. SUBVERSIVE AREAS OF CONCENTRATION REMAIN ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED IN CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT, GUAZAPA VOLCANO AREA AND NORTHERN MORAZAN DEPARTMENT WHERE THEY HAVE INTENSIFIED THEIR CONTROL NORTH OF THE TAROLA RIVER. THE PERIOD WAS MARKED BY FURTHER REDUCTION IN URBAN TERRORISM AND THE CONCENTRATION OF ATTACKS ON THE LINKS WITH THE EASTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY AS WELL AS ON THE HARVEST. THE ALREADY WEAKENED ECONOMY REMAINS SERIOUSLY ENDANGERED BY THESE ADDITIONAL BLOWS. AFTER SHOWING A MARKED DOWNWARD TREND DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1982 ALL INDICES OF VIOLENCE TOWARD CIVILIANS HAVE TENDED TO LEVEL OFF DURING THE SECOND HALF. DISPLACED PERSON POPULATIONS AND U.S. VISA APPLICATIONS BOTH REACHED RECORD NUMBERS.

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- THERE IS A PERCEPTION THAT MORALE OF THE EL SALVA-
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DORAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP HAS SLIPPED DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS DUE TO: THE DISPUTE AMONG MINDEF GARCIA, ARENA AND MID-LEVEL OFFICERS CENTERING AROUND COL OCHOA; THE INTRACTABILITY OF THE GUERRILLA; THE GUERRILLA STRATEGY OF CAPTURING AND THEN RELEASING ESAF SOLDIERS; AND FRUSTRATION WITH CIVILIAN POLITICIANS. THE RESULT OF THIS APPARENT LOSS OF DIRECTION IN THE ARMED FORCES HAS BEEN PROCRASTINATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PROSECUTING THE WAR. THERE IS, HOWEVER, A PLAN FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY BATTALIONS, BRIGADES AND MILITARY DETACHMENTS AND AN ONGOING PROSPECT TO DEVELOP A COMBINED MILITARY/CIVIL ACTION STRATEGY. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LEADERSHIP CHANGES IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1982 CONCERNED COL JAIME FLORES BEING GIVEN NOMINAL COMMAND OF A MILITARY THEATER OF OPERATIONS INCLUDING EVERYTHING EAST OF THE RIO LEMPA. COL CARRANZA WAS MOVED OUT OF ANTEL TO CEL AND GARCIA ALLY, COL GOMEZ WAS MOVED INTO ANTEL. ALL OF THE US TRAINED CADETS ARE NOW IN THE FIELD EXCEPT FOR 38 BEING USED AS ASSISTANT INSTRUCTORS AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY. THE EL SALVADOR ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF DEMONSTRATES AN IMPROVED ABILITY TO PLAN AND SUPPORT MULTI-UNIT, JOINT, AND SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS. THE PACT OF APANECA ANNOUNCED IN AUGUST PROVIDED A BASIC PLATFORM FOR PURSUING A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PACIFICATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY. MILITARY OFFICERS ARE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION FORMED BY THE PACT. THE GOES STILL HAS A DRAFT NATIONAL

AMNESTY PLAN UNDER CONSIDERATION. HANDLING OF THE PRESS
SHOWED NO IMPROVEMENT IN ITS DISMAL PERFORMANCE.

-

- PROGNOSIS: THE CRISIS CAUSED BY THE REFUSAL OF COL
OCHOA TO BE TRANSFERRED ABROAD AND HIS DEMAND FOR THE
RESIGNATION OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE GARCIA CLOUD THE PROG-

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ACTION ARA-16

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(ADS) W

-----251071 021343Z /72

R 151737Z JAN 83 (MRN CORRECTION)
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3839
SECDEF WASHDC
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AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN 00436 VICE 60436 SECTION 02)

NOSIS AT THIS TIME. AN ASSESSMENT WILL BE REQUIRED XN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE RESOLUTION OF THIS CRISIS. WE BELIEVE
THAT THE POINTS RAISED IN THIS PERIODIC MILITARY ASSESS-
MENT WILL PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR SUCH AN ANALYSIS. IT IS
NOTEWORTHY THAT THE ISSUES OUTLINED HERE -- A GENERAL PER-
CEPTION OF IMPROVED ARMED FORCES STRENGTH AND CAPABILITY

COMBINED WITH A LACK OF NATIONAL STRATEGY AND OF EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES -- ARE THE ISSUES BEHIND THE DIVISIONS IN THE OFFICER CORPS WITH WHICH EL SALVADOR IS NOW CONFRONTED. END SUMMARY.

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3. PART I -- CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION

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- A. FRIENDLY FORCES

- AS OF DECEMBER 1982, THE ARMED FORCES/SECURITY FORCES OF EL SALVADOR CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING:

- ARMY	19,897
- NAVY	447
- AIR FORCE	885
- NATIONAL GUARD	3,544
- NATIONAL POLICE	4,943
- TREASURY POLICE	2,041

- TOTAL 31,757

- THIS REPRESENTS A TOTAL INCREASE IN 1982 OF 8,582 PEOPLE, INCLUDING ONE NEW IMMEDIATE REACTION BATTALION (RAMON BELLOSO), AND TWO NEW VENEZUELAN-TRAINED "CAZADORES" BATTALIONS.

- OFFICER FIGURES FOR THE YEAR ARE AS FOLLOWS:

	1 JAN	OTHER	31 DEC 1982	
-CATEGORIES	1982	KIA	WIA	DEATHS MIA (INCL MIA/WIA)

FIELD GRADE

OFFICERS	234	2	4	-	1	232
----------	-----	---	---	---	---	-----

JUNIOR GRADE

OFFICERS	649	17	51	5	1	627
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TOTALS	883	19	55	5	2	859
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CADETS	450	9	18	3	1	438
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- ARMED FORCES CASUALTIES THE LAST TWO YEARS HAVE BEEN AS FOLLOWS:

- KIA WIA
- 1982 1,145 2,398
- 1981 998 1,882
-
- SUPPLIES AND AMMUNITION ARE AT SATISFACTORY LEVELS WITH THE FOLLOWING EXCEPTIONS:
- (1) 40MM, 90MM, 50 CAL AND 105MM STOCKS ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT COMBAT OPERATIONS FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH. PARTIAL SHIPMENT OF THESE ITEMS, AS REQUESTED IN OUR MSG 242304 NOV 82, IS EXPECTED IN JAN 83.
- (2) ALSO AT LOW LEVPLS ARE LBE ITEMS. 5000 SETS WILL BE REQUESTED UPON APPROVAL BF ADDITIONAL FUNDS.
- B. INSURGENTS
- WE ESTIMATE INSURGENT STRENGTH AS FOLLOWS:
- DEC 1982 DWC 1981 DEC 1980

ARMED COMBATANTS 4000--5000 4000--5000 3000--4000

- THE INSURGENTS DEMONSTRATED A SURGE CAPABILITY DURING THE OCTOBER/NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE WITH ONE ESTIMATE PUTTING THEIR ARMED STRENGTH AT 6000--9000. IF THESE HIGH NUMBERS DID, IN FACT, EXIST THEY MOST LIKELY RESULTED FROM ARMING PART OF THE MILITIA. THE ARMED FORCES COMMENTED ON THE LACK OF EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING OF MANY OF THE INSURGENT CASUALTIES DURING THIS PERIOD.

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R 151737Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3840
SCDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

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- DURING THEIR OCTOBER/NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE, THE INSURGENTS DEMONSTRATED AN ABILITY TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS THAT HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN IN EVIDENCE. IN PRIOR "OFFENSIVES," GUERRILLAS WOULD GENERALLY SUSTAIN OPERATIONS FOR SOME TWO-THREE WEEKS, THEN "STAND-DOWN" FOR ONE-TWO MONTHS TO REFIT, RETRAIN, AND RECUPERATE. BY CONTRAST, THE INSURGENTS WERE ABLE TO SUSTAIN RELATIVELY HIGH LEVELS OF ACTIVITIES AGAINST MILITARY, AS WELL AS NORMAL ECONOMIC TARGETS. THIS CAPABILITY DIMINISHED ONLY SLIGHTLY IN DECEMBER. ALSO UNLIKE PREVIOUS ACTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN LIMITED TO ONE GENERAL AREA, INSURGENTS DEMONSTRATED AN ABILITY TO STRIKE AT AND SEIZE TARGETS IN CHALATENANGO, MORAZAN, AND LA UNION DEPARTMENTS, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY INCREASING ATTACKS IN USulután AND SANTA ANA DEPARTMENTS.

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- ESTIMATES OF INSURGENT CASUALTIES ARE EXTREMELY UNRELIABLE. THE ARMED FORCES CARRY THE FOLLOWING ROUGH COUNT:

-	KIA	WIA
- 1982	3,360	556
- 1981	4,373	212

- C. THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE TO ARMED FORCES

- REFTTEL CONTAINS A DETAILED SUMMARY OF THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE. SINCE THAT TIME WE HAVE NOTED THE FOLLOWING CHANGES:

- -- VENEZUELAN TRAINERS DEPARTED COUNTRY IN MID-SEPTEMBER AFTER COMPLETING TRAINING OF THE "CAZADORES" BATTALIONS AND AFTER HAVING RECEIVED THREATS TO THEIR OWN SECURITY.

- (1) ESAF OFFICERS AND CADETS AS OF 31 OCT 82 WERE ATTENDING COURSES IN THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES:

- (A) ARGENTINA -- 1
- (B) CHILE -- 5
- (C) COLOMBIA -- 4
- (D) GUATEMALA -- 3
- (E) ITALY -- 1
- (F) MEXICO -- 11
- (G) PARAGUAY -- 6
- (H) VENEZUELA -- 25

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- (2) IN ADDITION, NINE MEMBERS OF THE SALVADORAN COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE TRAVELLED TO TAIWAN IN LATE NOVEMBER TO ATTEND A SENIOR COURSE IN POLITICAL WARFARE FOR FOREIGN OFFICERS. THERE OFFICERS ARE EXPECTED TO RETURN IN FEBRUARY 1983.

-

- (D) THIRD COUNTRY ASSISTANCE TO SUBVERSIVES:

- (1) CUBA AND NICARAGUA CONTINUE TO BE THE MAIN SUPPLIERS OF FINANCES, ARMS, AMMUNITION, SUPPLIES, EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING TO THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT INSURGENTS. VIETNAM IS ALSO PROVIDING TRAINING AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT NORTH KOREA AND LIBYA ARE PROVIDING SIMILAR ASSISTANCE TO THE INSURGENTS. REPORTING INDICATES SOME FOREIGNERS ARE ADVISING, TRAINING AND FIGHTING WITH THE INSURGENTS IN EL SALVADOR. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT CUBAN OR NATIONALS FROM OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES (EXCLUDING NICARAGUA) ARE AMONG THEM.

- THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT (FDR) CONTINUES TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT OUTSIDE EL SALVADOR IN NUMEROUS COUNTRIES FROM SOURCES RANGING FROM INDIVIDUALS TO LEFTIST/SOCIALIST/COMUNIST PARTIES.

- (2) THE INSURGENTS CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ARMS AND SUPPLIES FROM NUMEROUS LOCATIONS BY LAND, AIR AND SEA. IN RECENT MONTHS, REPORTED SIGHTINGS OF UNCONTROLLED AIRCRAFT HAVE INCREASED SIGNIFICANTLY. IT APPEARS THAT THE INSURGENTS ARE NOW RECEIVING MORE SUPPLIES BY AIR THAN IN 1981. THIS PROBABLY REFLECTS AN IMPROVED MARITIME SUR-

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R 151737Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3841
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
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VEBLANCE EFFORT BY THE NAVY IN THE GULF OF FONSECA.

- (3) THE INSURGENTS CONTINUE TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS AND WEAPON SYSTEMS FROM ABROAD AND BY CAPTURING THEM FROM THE SALVADORAN MILITARY FORCES. WE ARE UNAWARE OF THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY NEW, SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS. THE HEAVIEST WEAPONS ARE RECOILLESS RIFLES, MORTARS AND 50 CAL. MACHINEGUNS.

- (4) ON 22 AUGUST 1982, HONDURAN AUTHORITIES CAPTURED ERP COMMANDER, ALEJANDRO MONTENEGRO, AND FOUR OTHER INSURGENTS. THE EXTEOIVE MATERIAL DEVELOPED FROM THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THESE INSURGENTS HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF NUMEROUS REPORTS SINCE LATE AUGUST. THE MATERIAL WHICH HAS BEEN VERIFIED DESCRIBED SALVADORAN INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN EL SALVADOR, INSURGENT TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN
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HONDURAS, ARMS TRANSPORTATION FROM NICARAGUA TO THE GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS, CUBAN DIRECTION TO THE SALVADORAN INSURGENT MOVEMENT, AND THE CUBAN DESIRE TO MOVE THE REVOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR TO HONDURAS AND ELSEWHERE IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

- (E) SIGNIFICANT ENGAGEMENT SECOND HALF OF 1982
- WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ENGAGEMENTS OF THE LAST SIX MONTHS:
 - (1) SUBVERSIVE INITIATED. BETWEEN 10 AND 12 OCTOBER THE GUERRILLAS LAUNCHED A MAJOR OFFENSIVE, "THE HEROES AND MARTYRS OF OCTOBER 1979-1980 NATIONAL MILITARY CAMPAIGN," PRINCIPALLY IN MORAZAN AND CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENTS, THOUGH OTHER DEPARTMENTS FELT THE EFFECTS. THIS OFFENSIVE MAY HAVE BEEN TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH FMLN PEACE PROPOSALS ANNOUNCED IN MEXICO DURING THE SAME TIME FRAME. IN CHALATENANGO, GUERRILLAS INITIALLY SEIZED THE TOWNS OF EL JICARO AND LAS VUELTAS, AND LATER LA LAGUNA. GUERRILLAS WERE NOT DISLODGED UNTIL OPERATION CHAVEZ MELENDEZ IN THE LATER PART OF NOVEMBER. IN MORAZAN, GUERRILLAS SEIZED PERQUIN, TOROLA, AND SAN FERNANDO. GUERRILLAS STILL CONTROL THESE TOWNS AS WELL AS ROSARIO, ARAMBALA, JOATECA, AND CORINTO. ESAF HAVE NOT MOUNTED AN OPERATION TO RETAKE THIS AREA AND IT REMAINS UNDER EFFECTIVE GUERRILLA CONTROL. IN LATE NOVEMBER, INSURGENTS STAGING FROM CORINTO ATTACKED AND SEIZED FOUR TOWNS (ANAMOROS, POLOROS, NEUVA ESPARTA, AND LISLIQUE) IN NORTHERN LA UNION DEPARTMENT. IN EARLY DECEMBER, ESAF TROOPS RETOOK THE TOWNS. NO STAY-BEHIND FORCES REMAINED, AND CONTROL OF THE AREA IS UNCERTAIN.

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- (2) GOVERNMENT INITIATED.
 - (A) LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS. ESAF CONDUCTED THREE LARGE-SCALE OPERATIONS DURING THE PAST SIX MONTHS:
 - -- DUENAS III - A 21-COMPANY OPERATION IN WESTERN USULUTAN DEPARTMENT IN LATE JULY.
 - -- AZENON PALMA - A 7-BATTALION OPERATION IN NORTHERN AND EASTERN SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT DURING LATE AUGUST.
 - CHAVEZ MELENDEZ - A 31-COMPANY OPERATION, WITH HONDURAN PARTICIPATION, IN EASTERN CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT DURING MID-NOVEMBER.

- (B) MEDIUM-SIZED OPERATIONS. IN WHAT MAY HAVE BEEN AN EFFORT TO MOVE AWAY FROM A COMMITMENT TO LARGE SCALE OPERATIONS, THE ESAF CONDUCTED FOUR MEDIUM-SIZED OPERATIONS, TWO CONCURRENTLY.
- -- GONZALO PORTILLO - INVOLVED THE TWO "CAZADORES" BATTALIONS PLUS A 5-COMPANY COMPOSITE BN OPERATING IN NORTHWESTERN SAN MIGUEL DEPARTMENT IN LATE SEPTEMBER/EARLY OCTOBER.
- -- CHARCO - AN OPERATION INVOLVING THE THREE IMMEDIATE REACTION BNS IN SOUTHWESTERN USULUTAN IN LATE SEPTEMBER/EARLY OCTOBER.
- MENJIVAR - A 12-COMPANY OPERATION INVOLVING PRIMARILY 2ND BDE ASSETS IN THE SOUTHERN SANTA ANA/CHALATENANGO

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ACTION ARA-16

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 NSC-01
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R 151737Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3842
SCDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
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AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOE
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA

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ORDER AREA IN MID-OCTOBER.

- -- A 14-COMPANY OPERATION INVOLVING TWO OF THE IMMEDIATE REACTIONS BNS IN NORTHERN LA UNION DEPARTMENT IN EARLY DECEMBER.
- (C) SMALL-SCALE OPERATIONS. WORTHY OF NOTE IS THAT SEVERAL SMALL SCALE OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED DURING THE OCTOBER-DECEMBER TIME FRAME WITH GENERALLY VERY GOOD RESULTS:
- -- SAN MIGUEL DEPARTMENT. IN RESPONSE TO THE OCTOBER/NOVEMBER GUERRILLA INITIATIVES IN HIS DEPARTMENT, COL JAIME ((FLORES)), 3RD BDE COMMANDER, LAUNCHED THREE SMALL SCALE OPERATIONS (ONE IN SOUTHERN, TWO IN NORTHERN SAN MIGUEL DEPARTMENTS). PRIMARY FORCE EMPLOYED WAS THE SECRET

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CUSCATLAN BN.

- -- CUSCATLAN DEPARTMENT -- IN MID-DECEMBER, THE RAMON BELLOSSO BN WAS DEPLOYED TO THE EASTERN SLOPES OF THE GUAZAPA VOLCANO AREA WHERE IT CONDUCTED A FOUR-DAY OPERATION FROM COMPANY-SIZED PATROL BUSES.
- -- SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT - ALSO IN MID-DECEMBER COL NAPOLEON ((ALVARADO)) CONDUCTED AN OPERATION IN NORTHERN SAN VICENTE WITH 5TH BDE ASSETS.
- F. SUBVERSIVE AREA OF CONCENTRATION
- (1) YATTHE END OF 1982, THERE WERE THREE MAJOR SUBVERSIVE AREAS OF CONCENTRATION AND STRENGTH:
- (A) CHALATENANGO DEPARTMENT -- INCLUDES THE AREA EAST FROM TRONCAL DEL NORTE TO THE CABANAS BORDER.
- (B) GUAZAPA VOLCANO AREA -- INCLUDES NORTH CENTRAL CUSCATLAN AND SAN SALVADOR DEPARTMENTS AND PORTIONS OF WESTERN CABANAS DEPARTMENT.
- (C) NORTHERN MORAZAN DEPARTMENT -- INCLUDES ALMOST ALL OF THE AREA NORTH OF RIO TOLOLA, EXCEPT FOR THE MAIN N-S HIGHWAY FROM THE RIVER NORTH TO JOCOATIQUE.
- (2) OTHER IMPORTANT AREAS OF CONCENTRATION ARE:
- (A) WESTERN USULUTAN DEPARTMENT -- ALTHOUGH CONCEN-

TRATIONS HERE ARE NOT BELIEVED TO BE AS LARGE AS IN THE MORE NORTHERN PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, GUERRILLAS HAVE OPERATED ALMOST AT WILL, ATTACKING ECONOMIC TARGETS AS SECRET

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WELL AS MILITARY PATROLS AND OUTPOSTS. IHIS ACTIVITY APPEARS TO HAVE STEADILY INCREASED OVER THE LATTER HALF OF THE YEAR DESPITE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ATONAL BATTALION TO USULUTAN IN MID-SEPTEMBER.

- (B) NORTHERN LA UNION DEPARTMENT
- (C) NORTHERN AND EASTERN SAN VICENTE DEPARTMENT
- (D) NORTHERN SAN MIGUEL DEPARTMENT
- (3) GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY BEGAN TO INCREASE DURING THE LAST THREE MONTHS OF THE YEAR. MOST OF THE ACTIVITY OCCURRED IN SANTA ANA DEPARTMENT. GUERRILLA CONCENTRATIONS AND STRENGTHS MAY BE INCREASING THERE.
- STATISTICS PROVIDED BY THE INTERIOR MINISTRY AND THER GOES OFFICIALS IN EARLY OCTOBER 1982 SHOWED THAT APPROXIMATELY 45-50 OF THE 263 MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS WERE EITHER CLOSEJ OR FUNCTIONING LESS THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE TIME. ALL OF THE MUNICIPALITIES AFFECTED BY THE VIOLENCE ARE IN THE EASTERN TWO-THIRDS OF THE COUNTRY. AT LEAST 11 OF THESE MUNICIPALITIES WERE COMPLETELY CLOSED (6 IN CHALATENANGO, 2 EACH IN SAN VICENTE AND USULUTAN, AND 1 IN LA PAZ). AT LEAST ANOTHER 11 MUNICIPALITIES IN NORTHERN MORAZAN WERE VIRTUALLY INCOMUNICADO. WHILE THESE STATISTICS HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY THE GUERRILLA OFFENSIVE AND THE NOVEMBER 5 APPOINTMENTS OF NEW MAYORS, THE BASIC NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS OF THE AFFECTED MUNICIPALITIES HAVE PROBABLY REMAINED ABOUT THE SAME.

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FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3843
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

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- BETWEEN JANUARY 1, 1980 AND OCTOBER 6, 1982 THE GOES
CLOSED 826 OF ITS 3,209 BASIC (PRIMARY) SCHOOLS. VIR-
TUALLY EVERY MUNICIPALITY HAS BEEN AFFECTED. EDUCATION
MINISTER CARLOS AQUILINO DUARTE BLAMES RIGHTIST VIOLENCE
FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE PROBLEMS. 28 OF 321 MEDICAL
ESTABLISHMENTS HAVE ALSO BEEN CLOSED IN THE PAST FOUR
YEARS. MANY OF THESE CLOSINGS WERE PROBABLY ALSO DUE TO
RIGHTIST VIOLENCE.

;. PART II -- IMPACT OF MILITARY SITUATION ON CIVILIAN
ACTIVITY

- A. THE ECONOMY

- THE ECONOMY OF EL SALVADOR, ALREADY SUFFERING FROM
A 25 PERCENT DECLINE IN REAL GNP SINCE 1979, REMAINED THE
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PRINCIPAL TARGET OF THE INSURGENTS DURING THE SECOND HALF
OF 1982. THE PERIOD WAS MARKED BY A FURTHER REDUCTION IN
URBAN TERRORISM (UNCONFIRMED INTELLIGENCE REPORTS REPORTED
IN THE LAST ASSESSMENT INDICATING AN ATTEMPT TO RENEW
URBAN INSURGENCY ON A LARGE SCALE WERE NOT PROVEN COR-
RECT.) INSTEAD, THERE WAS A CONCENTRATION OF ATTACKS ON
THE COMMUNICATIONS AND ENERGY LINKS TO THE EASTERN THIRD

OF THE COUNTRY AS WELL AS ON THE HARVEST, ESPECIALLY IN THE COTTON PRODUCING AREAS OF USULUTAN. A NEW SUBVERSIVE TACTIC ADDED THIS YEAR WAS FIRING UPON PLANES AND THREATENING PILOTS EMPLOYED IN CROP DUSTING. THIS TACTIC SUCCEEDED IN GROUNDING PLANES DURING THE CRITICAL PERIOD WHEN COTTON REQUIRED INSECTICIDE AT LEAST EVERY FIVE DAYS AND COULD REDUCE COTTON CROPS IN AFFECTED AREAS BY 40 PERCENT. WHILE THE ATTACKS ON ROADS, BRIDGES, AND ELECTRIC TOWERS CONTINUED, NO MAJOR ELEMENTS OF THE ANOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE WERE DESTROYED DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE YEAR. HOWEVER, THE OIL REFINERY IN ACAJUTLA NARROWLY MISSED BEING PUT OUT OF COMMISSION FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD AS A RESULT OF AN ATTACK IN OCTOBER. THERE WAS A SLIGHT INCREASE IN INSURGENT ACTIVITY IN THE NORMALLY PEACEFUL WESTERN AREA OF THE COUNTRY.

- OVERALL, IN THE EASTERN THIRD OF THE COUNTRY, ANY WORK OR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE MAJOR CITIES AND TOWNS IS RISKY FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THE SAME SITUATION PREVAILS IN MANY AREAS ALONG THE HONDURAN BORDER, ESPECIALLY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CHALATENANGO.

- C. VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS

- AFTER SHOWING A MARKED DOWNWARD TREND DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1982, ALL INDICES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
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CIVILIANS HAVE TENDED TO LEVEL OFF IN THE SECOND HALF (FACTORING OUT A CHANGE IN REPORTING METHODOLOGY IN SOME INDICES). PRESS REPORTS OF CIVILIAN DEATHS ATTRIBUTABLE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE NOW AVERAGE SLIGHTLY LESS THAN 50 PER WEEK IN AN ERRATIC PATTERN AS COMPARED TO 100 AT THE END OF 1981 AND AS MANY AS 200 EARLIER IN 1981. WE SEEM TO BE WITNESSING A SUBTLE SHIFT FROM URBAN TO RURAL INCIDENTS OF SUCH VIOLENCE BUT THE TREND IS NOT YET CLEAR.

- URBAN TERRORISM CONTINUES TO BE DIRECTED AGAINST ECONOMIC RATHER THAN HUMAN TARGETS, ALTHOUGH THE MURDER OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE FAIR DIRECTOR NICOLAS ESTABAN NASOR AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF BUSINESS LEADER MAURICIO CUELLAR IN SAN SALVADOR WERE EXCEPTIONS. ON THE BASIS OF THIS TREND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MODIFIED THE TRAVEL ADVISORY FROM ONE OF AN OUTRIGHT WARNING AGAINST ALL TRAVEL TO EL SALVADOR TO A MORE LIMITED ONE ABOUT TRAVEL BY ROAD, PARTICULARLY TO THE NORTHEASTERN REACHES OF THE COUNTRY.

- THERE HAVE BEEN NO ATTACKS ON FOREIGNERS IN URBAN AREAS DURING THE LAST SIX MONTHS. ONE AMERICAN WAS SHOT TO DEATH BY SALVADORAN SOLDIERS WHILE TRAVELING BY ROAD IN THE NORTHEAST UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE UNDER

INVESTIGATION.

- D.P. POPULATION TRENDS
- THE DISPLACED PERSONS COUNT AT THE END OF 1982 STOOD AT 237,000 AS COMPARED TO 212,000 AT THE END OF 1981. DURING 1982 THE COUNT REACHED A HIGH OF 252,000 IN OCTO-

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PAGE 01 SAN SA 00436 07 OF 07 151949Z
ACTION ARA-16

INFO OCT-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-10 CIAE-00 NSC-01
NSAE-00 SY-06 HA-08 PM-09 MCT-02 SP-02 /065 W
-----277246 152009Z /44

R 151737Z JAN 83
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3844
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
AMEMBASSY CARACAS
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
AMEMBASSY PANAMA
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

S E C R E T SECTION 07 OF 07 SAN SALVADOR 00436

BER. THE DECLINE BETWEEN OCTOBER AND DECEMBER 1982 IS IN PART DUE TO THE CYCLICAL INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT DURING THIS PERIOD.

- VISA DEMAND CONTINUES AT HIGH LEVELS. WE ARE PROCESSING OVER 40,000 PEOPLE A YEAR FOR NONIMMIGRANT

VISAS AND EXPECT THIS TO CONTINUE. THESE FIGURES ARE THE HIGHEST EVER. EVEN DURING THE 1978-81 PERIOD OF TURMOIL FIGURES WERE NOT THIS HIGH. WE ARE ISSUING ALL AVAILABLE IMMIGRANT VISAS AND COULD ISSUE MORE EXCEPT FOR DEPARTMENT IMPOSED WORLDWIDE CUT OFFS IN 4 OUT OF THE 6 PREFERENCE CATEGORIES.
HINTON

SECRET

NNN

EXHIBIT G



BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

EL SALVADOR
Lieutenant Colonel* Domingo MONTERROSA Barrios
January 1984

(U) NAME: Lieutenant Colonel* Domingo Monterrosa Barrios (mohn-teh-ROH-sah), Artillery Officer, El Salvador Armed Force.

(U) POSITION: Commander, 3d Infantry Brigade, since 25 November 1983. He succeeds Colonel Ernesto Jaime Flores.



(U)

1983

EL SALVADOR
Lieutenant Colonel Domingo MONTERROSA Barrios
January 1984

(U) CAREER:

- 1959-1963 - Cadet, Military Academy, San Salvador, about February 1959-
November 1963; graduated second in the class and
commissioned Second Lieutenant, 12 November 1963; received
awards from Chief of the US Army Mission in El Salvador and
the Chilean Ambassador.
- Platoon leader, Support Company, Arms and Services School,
San Salvador.
- 1965-1966 - Platoon leader, 1st Infantry Company (Airborne), Ilopango
Air Base.
- 1966 - Platoon leader, Cadet Company, Military Academy. Student,
Parachute Ranger Course, US Army School of the Americas,
Ft. Gulick, Panama, March-May. Promoted to First
Lieutenant, 24 December.
- 1968 - Commander, 1st Squadron, Cavalry Group.
- 1969 - Chief, Administration Section (Adjutant and Supply
Officer), Cavalry Group.
- 1970 - Commander, 6th Company, 3rd Infantry Command, Chalatenango.
- 1971 - Student, Advanced Infantry Training, Arms and Services
School, San Salvador. Promoted to Captain, 30 July.
- 1972? - Commander, Airborne Company (now called Base Security
Group).
- 1973 - Student, Alouette helicopter flight training, France,
January-March.
- 1975-1977 - Commander, Parachute Squadron, 1975, concurrently, student,
Command and General Staff Course, Armed Force Studies
Center (Centro de Estudios de la Fuerza Armada/CEFA), 1975-
November 1977. Promoted to Major, 31 December 1976.

157

EL SALVADOR
Lieutenant Colonel Domingo MONTERROSA Barrios
January 1984

- 1977-1979 - Commander, Base Security Group (Airborne Company), Ilopango Air Base, from 1977. Student, Political Warfare Course, Taiwan, September-about December 1978.
- 1979 - Assistant Professor, Armed Force Studies Center (CEFA).
Section Chief, D-1, Armed Force General Staff.
- 1980 - Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, 31 December.
- 1981 - Commander, Atlacatl Battalion, from February 1981-November 1983.
- 1983 - Commander, 3d Infantry Brigade (San Miguel), since 25 November.

EXHIBIT H

4 (39)



BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

EL SALVADOR

Colonel Natividad Jesus CACERES Cabrera
December 1987

(U) NAME: Colonel Natividad Jesus Caceres Cabrera,
Army.

(U) POSITION: Commander, 6th Military Detachment,
Sonsonate Department, since June 1987. He succeeds
Colonel Oscar Armando Amaya Perez.

40

Colonel [REDACTED]

- 1966-1969
 - Graduated from the Military Academy and commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the Infantry, 1966.
 - Platoon Leader, 1st Rifle Company, 1st Infantry Battalion, 3d Infantry Brigade, San Miguel, 1966-1968.
 - Promoted to First Lieutenant, 1969.
- 1970-1971
 - Instructor, Military Academy.
- 1971-1973
 - Guest Instructor, US Army School of the Americas (USARSA), Fort Gulick, Panama.
- 1974-1976
 - Instructor, Arms and Services School, San Salvador.
- 1977-1979
 - Student, Command and General Staff College, San Salvador.
 - Promoted to Major, 1978.
- 1980-1982
 - Executive Officer, Atlacatl Immediate Reaction Battalion.
 - Instructor, Command and General Staff College, 1982.
 - Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, December, 1982.
- 1982-1984
 - Assistant Military Attache to the US and concurrently, Student, Inter-American Defense College (IADC), Washington, DC.

EL SALVADOR
Colonel Natividad Jesus CACERES Cabrera
December 1987

1984-1987

- Executive Officer, Treasury Police, 1984-1986.
- Commander, 1st Military Detachment, Chalatenango Department, February 1986-June 1987.
- Commander, 6th Military Detachment, Sonsonate Department, since June 1987.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

NOTIFICATION OF APPOINTMENT OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC OFFICER

TO:

The Secretary of State, Attention: Office of Protocol

1. FULL NAME (First, Middle, Last) (Please Capitalize Last Name)

Natividad Jesús CACERES-CABRERA

2. RESIDENCE ADDRESS IN U.S.

3. NAME OF GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED

EL SALVADOR

4. TYPE OF PASSPORT AND VISA

5. DATE AND PLACE OF ARRIVAL IN U.S.

6. DIPLOMATIC TITLE OR RANK, PLUS FUNCTIONAL DESIGNATION, IF ANY.

Assistant Armed Forces Attaché

7. EFFECTIVE DATE
June 15, 1983

8. NATIONALITY

9. DATE OF BIRTH

10. PLACE OF BIRTH

11. BIOGRAPHIC DATA

- 1966 - Graduated from Escuela Militar General Gerardo Barrios of El Salvador as Second Lieutenant
- 1969 - Promoted to Lieutenant
- 1973 - Promoted to Captain
- 1978 - Promoted to Major
- 1982 - Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel

SEE ATTACHMENT

FULL NAME OF SPOUSE

13. DATE, PLACE OF BIRTH AND NATIONALITY OF SPOUSE

NAME AND DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH OF CHILDREN RESIDING IN U.S. (Note: Permanent departure of a child from the U.S. prior to termination of parent's diplomatic assignment, as well as subsequent arrival of a dependent child from abroad, is to be reported to Protocol by diplomatic note.)

Signature of Official

Signature of Chief of Mission

Date
June 22, 1983Enclosure: Two passport size photographs of both the diplomatic officer and spouse
(taken within last 12 months)

EXHIBIT I

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTERPTTUZYUW RUEALA4274 1412130
PRIORITY
P 211503Z MAY 82

FM USDAO SAN SALVADOR ES

TO DIA WASHDC//DB-3E2/JSI-46/OS-1/DB-3E

INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN//SCJ2-IAD
CMOR JSOC FT BRAGG NC//J3-2//
CDR 470TH MI GP FT CLAYTON PN//IAGPP-PN
CDR193RDINFBDE(PAN) FT CLAYTON PN//AFZU-OS
COMUZZLCARIB KEY WEST FL//J3-2
MACOS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//INW
USDAO GUATEMALA CITY GT
USDAO PANAMA CITY PN
CINCLANT NORFOLK
CDRUSAITAC AMS VA//IAX-SO-1//
CG THIRD MAW
USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO
EMBASSY MANAGUA
USDAO LIMA PE

BT

UNCLAS

SUBJ: IP 6 829 0244 82/EL SALVADOR/PRESS CONFERENCE, CHIEF
OF THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF

THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL.

1. CTRY: EL SALVADOR (ES)
2. IR NO: 6 829 0244 82
3. TITLE: PRESS CONFERENCE, CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES
GENERAL STAFF

4.368

53 91 8.19: 820517

5. ORIG: USDAO SAN SALVADOR, ES

6. REQ REFS: A.M-4BX-22249; B. M-4BX-22269

7. SOURCE: LOCAL PRESS REPORTS

8. SUMMARY: THRU IR CONTAINS A XIMMARIZED TRANS
JTIONYBUA PRESS XBNFYENCE PRESENTED ON 17 MAY BY THE CHIEF OF THE
ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF, COLONEL RAFAEL ((FLORES)) LIMA,
WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY HIS D-III OFFICER, LTC JESUS
GABRIEL ((CONTRERAS)).,.

9A. DETAILS:

(1) COLONEL FLORES LIMA BEGAN BY EXPLAINING THAT GENERAL
JAIME ABDOLE JG((GUTIERREZ)) COULD NO LONGER DISCHARGE HIS
DUTIES AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES AS
PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT, DR. ALVARO ((MAGANA)). BY CONSTI-
TUTIONAL MANDATE, WAS ALSO COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ARMED
FORCES. HE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD DELEGATE THE
POSITION OF COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES FOR
OPERATIONS WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES SO WARRANTED IT. GENERAL
GUTIERREZ REMAINS IN AN INACTIVE, RESERVE STATUS WITHIN
THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF (NO NOTE: HE IS PRESENTLY
ON VACATION IN THE BAHAMAS).

(2) WITH REGARD TO THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY,

THE CHIEF OF STAFF SAID THAT THE WAR AGAINST THE GUERRILLA
HAS NOT ENDED BUT THAT LEFTIST SUBVERSION WAS DETERIORATING.
HE ADDED THAT THERE WERE STILL SUBVERSIVE ACTIONS AND
BASE CAMPS IN THE NORTHERN DEPARTMENTS OF CHALATENANGO,
MORAZAN, SAN VICENTE, AND IN THE VICINITY OF GUAZAPA (8206).

(3) EACH MILITARY COMMANDER HAS THE AUTHORITY TO
ORGANIZE AND CONTROL HIS RESPECTIVE ZONE AND THAT ONLY
LARGE-SCALE OPERATIONS WERE COORDINATED BY THE GENERAL
STAFF. HE SAID ALSO THAT THE "GENERAL JUAN RAMON
BELLOSO" BATTALION WILL SEE ACTION SOON AND THAT THIS
ORGANIZATION WOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PRESS IN A SPECIAL CEREMONY. THE GOZATONAL
BATTALION WAS CONCLUDING ITS TRAINING BUT (WHIN TWO MONTHS WOULD BE L

ADY TO ENTFX C BAT. ALL THREE
BATTALIONS, "ATLACATL", "GENERAL JUAN RAMON BELLOSO",
AND "ATONAL" ARE IMMEDIATE REACTION UNITS WHO HAVE THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF PROVIDING SECURITY TO THE COUNTRY.

(4) WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN MILITARY ADVISING, HE
SAID THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATES AND CHILE PROVIDED
IT TO THE ARMED FORCES BUT THAT THERE WERE AGREEMENTS
WITH ARGENTINA AND VENEZUELA, RESPONDING TO A QUESTION.
HE SAID THAT THE ARMED FORCES HAD ALWAYS INVITED THE
SUBVERSIVES TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND THAT THEY HAVE
HEARD THE ISLL OF THE ARMY OFFERING THEM SAFEPASSES
AND FACILITIES SO THAT THEY COULD BE REINCORPORATED
INTO SOCIETY. HE MENTIONED THAT HE IS PREPARING A
GENERAL PLAN OF AMNESTY WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE POLITICAL
PRISONERS. WITH REGARD TO A DIALOGUE OR NEGOTIATION
WITH LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS, HE SAID THAT THERE WAS A
FIRM POSITION TO EXCLUDE ANY SUCH POSSIBILITY.

(5) FINALLY, HE SAID THAT THE ARMED FORCES WILL MORE
EFFECTIVELY CONTROL THE CARRYING OF ARMS IN ORDER TO
AVOID FUTURE ABUSES BY THOSE WHO CLAIM PERSONAL SECURITY
AND OSTENTATIONOUSLY CARRY THEIR WEAPONS, THEREBY CREATING
CONFUSION AND FEAR AMONG THE PEOPLE. "THE SECURITY OF
THE PEOPLE NATURALLY CONCERNS US BUT WE ARE NOT GOING
TO ALLOW MORE ABUSES", HE SAID.

9B. ORIG CMTS: GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE PRESS CONFERENCE
WAS HIGHLY INFORMATIVE, EFFECTIVE, AND TIMELY AND DESIGNED
FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONSUMPTION.

10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A

11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE

12. (U) SPEC INST: NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

13. (U) PREP BY

14. (U) APP BY:

15. (U) C

Q EVAL: NO REL TO: N/A

16. (U) ENCL: N/A

17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

BT

ACTION DB-3E2(1)

(U.6.7.8.F)

INFO NIDS(1) J3:MMCC(1) J5(2) ADJTF LO(1) SECDEF(1)
SECDEF(9) USDP(15) ASD:PAEE(1) NMIC(1) RTS-2B(1)
OS-1(1) SWS(1) JSI-4B(1) DC-4(1) DC-4A(1) AT(1)
AT-X(1) AIS(1) BIO(1) DE(1) DE-1G(1) DB-3E(2)
DB-4A(1) DB-5D(1) DB-1E(1) DT-1(1) DIA(1)
+CSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+CIA WASHINGTON DC
+SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

MCN=82141/04037

TOP=82141/2238Z

TAD=82141/2254Z

CCSN=M14531

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 OF 1
211503Z MAY 82

EXHIBIT J

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTERPTTUZYUW RUEALA4274 1412130
PRIORITY
P 211503Z MAY 82

FM USDAO SAN SALVADOR ES

TO DIA WASHDC//DB-3E2/JSI-46/OS-1/DB-3E

INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN//SCJ2-IAD
CMOR JSOC FT BRAGG NC//J3-2//
CDR 470TH MI GP FT CLAYTON PN//IAGPP-PN
CDR193RDINFBDE(PAN) FT CLAYTON PN//AFZU-OS
COMUZZLCARIB KEY WEST FL//J3-2
MACOS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//INW
USDAO GUATEMALA CITY GT USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
USDAO PANAMA CITY PN USDAO TEGUCIGALPA HO
CINCLANT NORFOLK AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
CDRUSAITAC AMS VA//IAX-SO-1// USDAO LIMA PE
CG THIRD MAW

BT

UNCLAS

SUBJ: IP 6 829 0244 82/EL SALVADOR/PRESS CONFERENCE, CHIEF
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GENERAL STAFF

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53 91 8.19: 820517

5. ORIG: USDAO SAN SALVADOR, ES

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7. SOURCE: LOCAL PRESS REPORTS

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FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONSUMPTION.

10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A

11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE

12. (U) SPEC INST: NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

13. (U) PREP BY

14. (U) APP BY:

15. (U) C

Q EVAL: NO REL TO: N/A

16. (U) ENCL: N/A

17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

BT

ACTION DB-3E2(1)

(U.6.7.8.F)

INFO NIDS(1) J3:MMCC(1) J5(2) ADJTF LO(1) SECDEF(1)
SECDEF(9) USDP(15) ASD:PAEE(1) NMIC(1) RTS-2B(1)
OS-1(1) SWS(1) JSI-4B(1) DC-4(1) DC-4A(1) AT(1)
AT-X(1) AIS(1) BIO(1) DE(1) DE-1G(1) DB-3E(2)
DB-4A(1) DB-5D(1) DB-1E(1) DT-1(1) DIA(1)
+CSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+CIA WASHINGTON DC
+SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

MCN=82141/04037

TOP=82141/2238Z

TAD=82141/2254Z

CCSN=M14531

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 1 OF 1
211503Z MAY 82

EXHIBIT K

00384

1981/11/27

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

PTTCZYUW RUESALA9037 3312020
PRIORITY
P 271535Z NOV 81

TO DIA WASHDC//DB-3E2,JS1-4B/RSS-1

INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN//SCJ2 CMDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC//J-2//
CDR 470TH MI GP FT CLAYTON PN//IAGPP-PN
CDR193RDINFBDE(PAN) FT CLAYTON PN//AFZU-DS
CCCJTF KEY WEST FL//J-2
MACOS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//INW

CINCLANT NORFOLK AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
CDRUSAITAC AHS VA//IA-X-TA-C

BT

SECTION 1 OF 2

SUBJ IR [REDACTED] EL SALVADOR/LEFTIST SENTIMENT IN
THE ARMED FORCES OF EL SALVADOR (U)
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. (U) CTRY: EL SALVADOR (ES)
2. (U) IR NO: [REDACTED]
3. (U) TITLE: LEFTIST SENTIMENT IN THE ARMED FORCES OF
EL SALVADOR
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 811121

B. SUMMARY: (ENTIRE TEXT [REDACTED])
A. THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER BY COLONELS JOSE GUILLERMO ((GARCIA)), MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SECURITY, AND RAFAEL ((FLORES)) LIMA, CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF, SINCE THE DEMISE OF COLONEL ADOLFO ARMOLDO ((MAJANO)) IN DECEMBER 1980 HAS ESSENTIALLY SUPPRESSED OPEN EXPRESSION OF SENTIMENTS THAT MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS LEFTIST, BUT WHICH SOME OFFICERS FEEL ARE THE TRUE SENTIMENTS AND IDEALS OF THE 15 OCTOBER 1979 COUP. BUT AS OF 21 NOVEMBER 1981, THE LEFTIST SENTIMENTS REMAINED WITHOUT A SPOKESMAN, NOR DID THERE APPEAR TO BE ANY IMMEDIATELY IDENTIFIABLE INDIVIDUAL WHO COULD COALESCE OFFICERS WHO HAD EITHER MAINTAINED OR DEVELOPED LEFTIST SYMPATHIES.
B. THE PROBLEM IS THAT CERTAIN OFFICERS, PARTICULARLY SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS WHO HAVE SEEN CONSIDERABLE ACTION, AND WHO HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO THE LIFE THAT THE MAJORITY OF THEIR ENLISTED MEN (CAMPESESINOS) HAVE BEEN BROUGHT UP IN, FEEL FRUSTRATED WITH THE FAILURE OF THE MILITARY TO EFFECTIVELY COMBAT THE INSURGENCY, AND TO GIVE DIRECTION TO THE IDEALS OF THE OCTOBER 1979 COUP. THE IDEALS OF THE COUP ARE BEING DEBASED FOR THE SAKE OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL'S AMBITION (NFI).
C. CHANGES HAVE BEEN MINIMAL IN THE SOCIETY AS A WHOLE, IN SPITE OF THE MUCH PUBLICIZED LAND REFORM. SOCIETY IN EL SALVADOR STILL CONSISTS OF TWO CLASSES: "THOSE WHO CAN NOT AFFORD A LAWYER; AND THOSE WHO FIGHT AMONG THEMSELVES TO RETAIN THE BEST LAWYERS". LYING AND INTENTIONALLY FALSE REPORTING BY MANY HIGHER

ACTION DB-3E2(*) (U,6,7,8,F)
INFO NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(*) RDJTF:LO(*) OPG-JPG(*)
SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(*) USDP(*) ASD:PA&E(*) DI-1(*)
NMIC(*) RTS-2B(1) RCM-2B1(*) RSS-1(*) SWS(*)
JS1-4B(*) DC-4(*) DC-4A(*) AT(*) AT-X(*) AIS(*)
DIO(*) DE(*) DB-1G(*) DB-3E(*) DB-4A(*) DB-5(*)
DB-1E(*) DT-1(*) DIA(*)
+CSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+CIA WASHINGTON DC
+SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

102/50
367/30
307/20
302/20
ES

125

RECEIVED
DEC -3 1981
UIC 115-28

Handwritten signature

MCN=81331/03271 TOR=81331/2126Z TAD=81331/2130Z CDSN=M11416

PAGE 1
271535Z NOV 81

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

MILITARY OFFICERS ADDS TO THE FRUSTRATION OF JUNIOR
OFFICERS TRYING TO CONSCIENTIOUSLY CARRY OUT THEIR DUTIES

[REDACTED]

D. ALTHOUGH OFFICERS WHO MAINTAIN, OR WHO HAVE
DEVELOPED, SYMPATHIES MORE TO THE LEFT THAN GENERALLY
CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE (BY THE CURRENT POWERS TO BEL.
MAY BE RELUCTANT TO EXPRESS THEIR TRUE SETIMENTS. THEY
DO EXIST AND THEY HAVE KEPT IN TOUCH WITH EACH OTHER.
E. THE MILITARY, AS AN INSTITUTION, HAS MAINTAINED
THAT IT IS APOLITICAL. BUT THE REALITY IS OTHER AN
THE IMAGE THAT IT IS TRYING TO PROJECT. THE MILITARY
REMAINS AN INSTITUTION WHICH CAN PROVIDE AMBITIOUS
INDIVIDUALS A MEANS OF UPWARD MOBILITY.

[REDACTED] AND THERE
ARE AMBITIOUS INDIVIDUALS IN IMPORTANT POSITIONS OF THE
MILITARY RIGHT NOW.
F. THERE REMAINS A DISTRUST OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT JUNTA, MAINLY BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY MEMBERS. THERE ARE VIEWED
BY MOST OF THE LEFTIST OFFICERS AS OPPORTUNISTS WHO
HAVE NO REAL INTEREST IN CARRYING OUT REFORMS. BUT
AGAIN THE CURRENT DISARRAY OF OFFICERS WITH LEFTIST
SYMPATHIES LEAVES THIS GROUP WITH LITTLE CHOICE BUT
TO SUPPORT THE JUNTA.

BT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

PTTCZYUW RUESALA9037 0312050
PRIORITY
P 271535Z NOV 81

TO DIA WASHDC//DB-3E2/JSI-4B/RSS-1

INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN//SCJ2 CMDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC//J-2//
CDR 470TH MI GP FT CLAYTON PN//IAGPP-PN
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CCCJTF KEY WEST FL//J-2
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CDRUSAITAC AMS VA//IAX-TA-C

BT

SECTION 2 OF 2

9A. (U) DETAILS: NONE

9B. (U) (ENTIRE TEXT)

(1) THE LEFTIST OFFICERS ARE VERY MUCH AWARE OF THEIR VULNERABILITY. THIS STEMS FROM THE POSITION AND POWER BASE OF THE CURRENT ARMED FORCES LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS FROM THE DEARTH OF LEADERSHIP AMONG THE LEFTIST OFFICERS. BUT ANIMOSITIES REMAIN IN THE OFFICER CORPS OVER THE MAJANO DISMISSAL AND THE BREAK-UP OF THE "PROGRESSIVES". MOUNTING FRUSTRATION WITH THE CONDUCT (BY THE MILITARY) OF THE WAR, A PERCEIVED LACK OF SOCIAL CHANGE, AND ADULTERATION OF THE IDEALS OF THE OCTOBER 1979 COUP MAY BE THE CATALYSTS THAT COALESCE A LEFTIST ELEMENT WITHIN THE MILITARY.

- 10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A
- 11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE
- 12. (U) SPEC INST: N/A
- 13. (U)
- 14. (U)
- 15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: N/A
- 16. (U) ENCL: N/A
- 17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

BT

ACTION DB-3E2(*) (I,M)

INFO NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(*) RDJTF:LO(*) OPG-JPG(*)
SECDEF:(*) SECDEF(*) USDP(**) ASD:PA&E(*) DI-1(*)
NMIC(*) RTS-2B(1) RCM-2B1(*) RSS-1(*) SWS(*)
JSI-4B(*) DC-4(*) DC-4A(*) AT(*) AT-x(*) AIS(*)
DIO(*) DE(*) DB-1G(*) DB-3E(*) DB-4A(*) DB-5(*)
DB-1E(*) DT-1(*) DIA(*)
+CSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+CIA WASHINGTON DC
+SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

MCN=81331/03409 TOR=81331/2202Z TAD=81331/2218Z CDSN=M11504

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TELEGRAM

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 034645

EXDIS MIL ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSSIVE

FOLLOWING SAN SALVADOR 1039 SENT ACTION SECSTATE FEB 8

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L SAN SALVADOR 1039

EXDIS

DEPT PASS TO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PANAMA
E.O. 12065: GDS 2/8/88 (HINTON, DEANE R) OR-M
TAGS: PINS PINT ES
SUBJECT: (C) THE GENERAL (GARCIA) WHO CAME FOR LUNCH
1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: GUILLERMO GARCIA, SALVADORAN MINISTER OF
DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SECURITY, MAY HAVE LOUSY INTELLIGENCE
ABOUT GUERRILLA OPERATIONS BUT HE HAD AN UNCANNY SENSE
OF OUR CONCERNS. AT A LONG LUNCH AT RESIDENCE
FEBURARY 6, HE SKILLFULLY OPENED WITH A NEAT SPEECH
ABOUT HOW HE AND HIS FORCES HAD TO DO BETTER IN
CONTROLLING EXCESSES, WHILE PROMOTING ELECTIONS WITHOUT
INVOLVING ARMY IN PARTISAN POLITICS. THEREAFTER FOR
TWO HOURS WE TALKED ALONE ABOUT THESE AND RELATED
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THEMES. HE IS THE VERY MODEL OF A MODERN POLITICALLY

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ASTUTE GENERAL, AT LEAST IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION, WITH A KNACK FOR PRE-EMPTING MY LINES. MAYBE HE HAD ADVANCE COPY OF SCRIPT, BUT NOT AT LEAST FROM ME. GARCIA - MADE MANY COMMITMENTS IN COURSE OF THIS CONVERSATION. (WE'LL SEE HOW MANY OF THEM AND HOW THEY ARE FULFILLED.) FOLLOWING ACCOUNT OF CONVERSATION WHICH FLOWED BACKWARDS AND FORWARD IS REARRANGED IN PART BY SUBJECT: ELECTIONS, POLITICAL OUTLOOK, VIOLENCE AND ARMY DISCIPLINE, D'AUBISSON AND "ARGENTINE SOLUTION", PUBLIC OPINION AND CONGRESS, NEED TO GO ON OFFENSIVE, THE WAR, INTELLIGENCE, ATTACK ON U.S. TV CREW; ARMED FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE (COPREFA); 506(A) ASSISTANCE AND PRIORITIES; THREAT TO U.S. PERSONNEL AT SHERATON; NICARAGUA. END SUMMARY.

3. ELECTIONS. GARCIA REPEATEDLY RAISED AND RE-INFORCED HIS OLD THEME ABOUT MEDIA DISTORTION. ONE CASE AT POINT, DISCUSSION OF WHICH HE INITIATED (WHO CIED HIM?), AS DISTORTION FIRST OF MY REMARKS TO CHRIST DICKEY ABOUT WHAT ELECTIONS WOULD AND WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH AND SUBSEQUENT DISTORTION OF HIS ENDORSEMENT OF MY VIEW THAT GIVEN UNFORTUNATE FOR REFUSAL TO PARTICIPATE, ELECTIONS WOULD NOT BE POLITICAL SOLUTION FOR WAR. I AGREED WITH HIS VIEW THAT WE HAD BEEN HAD AND HE AGREED WITH MY VIEW THAT RECORD HAD TO BE SET STRAIGHT. HE WILL DO SO NEXT WEEKK. HE SAYS. HIS ENTHUSIASM, AS MINE, IS UNDIMMED FOR ELCTIONS, BUT LET'S NOT KID OURSELVES, AT BEST THEY ARE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO A POLITICAL SOLUTION NOT THE POLITICAL SOLUTION. (STATE 031074)

4. GARCIA TOLD ME THAT ARMED FORCES WOULD PUBLISH DECLARATION THIS COMING WEEK ASKING POLITICAL PARTIES NOT TO ALLEGE OR IMPLY LINKS TO ARMED SERVICES. HE CITED

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MAJOR D'AUFYCSSON OF ARENA AS PRINCIPAL OFFENDER, QUOTING WITH GESTURES. THE MAJOR'S STANDARD LINE, "BROTHER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD, FRIENDS IN THE NATIONAL POLICE, COLLEAGUES IN THE ARMY" AS TOO MUCH TO SWALLOW. I SAID IT WOULD BE EQUALLY IMPORTANT, IF NOT MORE IMPORTANT, TO MAKE CLEAR TO MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES THAT THEY SHOULD NOT ENGAGE IN PARTISAN ACTIVITY. HE AGREED SAYING HE PLANNED TO ISSUE ORDER MONDAY ALONG THAT LINE INCLUDING STATEMENT THAT VIOLATORS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISCIPLINARY

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ACTION. FINE, I SAID, AND WHY NOT INCLUDE TEXT OF SAID ORDER IN OVERALL PROCLAMATION ON ATTITUDE OF ARMED FORCES TOAWRO ELECTIONS. GOOD AIDEA SAID GARCIA. SAID DECLARATION SHOULD ALSO BE CLARION CALL FOR MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION. ARMY WOULD NOT TELL POPULACE FOR WHOM TO VOTE, AS IT HAD IN THE PAST, BUT WOULD TELL THEM TO VOTE. GREAT, SAID I.

5. POLITICAL OUTLOOK.

GARCIA, WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT THERE ARE NO AGREED RULES OF THE GAME, THINKS FIRST ORDER OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY WILL BE TO FASHION NEW CONSTITUTION. THIS HE BELIEVES SHOULD BE RAPIDLY COMPLETED. THEN ASSEMBLY WOULD ELECT PROVISIONAL PRESIDENT. HE SAID THAT IN RETROSPECT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER FOR COUNTRY TO HAVE GONE DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. "SINGLE HEAD" IS NEEDED. HE MENTIONED HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED REFERENDUMHITO ISOLATE GUERRILLA ISSE AND TO HAVE ASSURED HIGH REFERENDUM IDEA, BUT THIS WAS FIRST TIME I HEARD GARCIA MENTION IT.) STILL, DIE WAS CAST AND EVERYTHING HAD TO BE DONE TO ASSURE HIGH VOTER TURN-OUT IN THESE ELECTIONS. HE THOUGHT JUNTA WOULD ISSUE AMENDMENTS TO ELECTORAL LAW NEXT WEEK TO PERMIT VOTING ANYWHERE IN COUNTRY RATHER THAN ONLY IN DEPARTMENT VOTER'S CEDULA HAD BEEN ISSUED AND TO EXTEND PERIOD FOR ISSUING CEDULAS.

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IN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE ELECTORAL OUTCOMES I SAID THAT EMBASSY WAS NEUTRAL. DECISION WAS FOR SALVADORANS NONETHELESS HE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT RESULTING GOVERNMENT WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT FACTOR EARING ON OUR POSSIBILITIES TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR. FOR EXAMPLE, COALITION THAT INCLUDED EXTREME RIGHTISTS WOULD CLEARLY COMPLICATE OUR TASK, PERHAPS FATALLY, WHEREAS CENTER GROUPING COMMITED TO PURSUE REFORMS WOULD MAKE MATTERS EASIER FOR US. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD, AND LATER TOOK YET ANOTHER SWIPE AT ARENA.

6. VIOLENCE AND ARMY DISCIPLINE.

I AGREED IN GENERAL WITH GARCIA'S VIEW OF MEDIA DISTORTION BUT IN DISCUSSION OF CASES HIT HARD ON NEED BOTH FOR GOOD PRODUCT TO SELL AND FOR BETTER SALESMANSHIP. GOOD PRODUCT PART OF EQUATION MEANS

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NO MORE MASSACRES, NO MORE SAN ANTONIO ABADS. I ADDED FOR GOOD MEASURE NEED TO TAKE FIRM QUICK PUBLIC DISCIPLINARY ACTION IF, DESPITE ALL EFFORTS, ABUSES OCCURRED. HE AGREED WITH FIRST POINT, BUT SEEMED UNEASY WITH IDEA OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION. I AGREED GOOD OFFICERS WERE IN SHORT SUPPLY AND THAT DISCIPLINARY ACTION MIGHT BE MISUNDERSTOOD AND RESENTED BY OTHER OFFICERS WHO WOULD CREDIT DISCIPLINE WITH ONLY TRYING TO DO HIS DUTY AS HE SAW IT TO ELIMINATE SUBVERSIVES.

HE INTIMATED SAN ANTONIO ABAD MAY HAVE BEEN SET-UP, BUT SAID FIRST BRIGADE HAD OVER-REACTED. WHEREAS LAST WEEK HE DEFENDED OPERATION, THIS TIME HE ACKNOWLEDGED ERRORS HAD BEEN MADE. STILL MAJOR IN COMMAND WAS OUTSTANDING OFFICER WHO WAS NEEDED. INVESTIGATION IS PROCEEDING AND IT IS TOO EARLY FOR HIM TO DRAW CONCLUSIONS. (NOTHING MUCH WILL HAPPEND
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HERE, I IMAGINE, BUT MAYBE MAYBE MAYBE NEXT TIME.) SAME PROBLEM WITH ILOPANGO DISASTER. BUSTILLO IS OUTSTANDING OFFICER AND BADLY NEEDED IN AIR FORCE. STIL IMPACT ON ON ARMED FORCES OF PROCEEDING AS THOUGH NOTHING HAD HAPPENED WAS A REAL CONCERN.

7. D'AUBUISSON HAD "ARGENTINE SOLUTION". INCIDENTALLY, HE TOLD ME, D'AUBUISSON WAS BRIEFLY ARRESTED WHEN ARRIVED IN AYIQUETA IN MORAZAN TO CAMPAIGN WITHOUT HAVING HAD FLIGHT CLEARANCE. AT OTHER POINTS IN CONVERSATION HE EXPRESSED DISTASTE FOR ARENA SAYING THEY WERE SEEKING VENGEANCE FOR PAST REFORMS NOT CONSTRUCTIVE FUTURE. ASTUTE AGGRESSIVE D'AUBUISSON WAS BEING USED BY REACTIONARY FORCES. (WAS GARCIA DISSEMBLING?).

I TOLD HIM I HAD HEARD, BUT COULD NOT VERIFY. THAT PRIVATELY D'AUBUISSON IS PROMISING THAT IF HE COMES TO POWER HE WILL "ELIMINATE" SUBVERSIVES WITHIN THREE MONTHS AND TO HELL WITH WORLD OPINION AND THE GRINGOS. (PUBLICLY HE TALKS OF NEED FOR PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN. I HOPED IT WERE BOTH TRUE, BUT IN MY JUDGEMENT IN UNLIKELY EVENT HE HAD OPPORTUNITY AND WERE TO TRY HE WOULD BOTH FAIL AND LOSE U.S. SUPPORT. THE SO-CALLED "ARGENTINE SOLUTION" SIMPLY WOULD NOT WORK HERE--WHERE IN LONG RUN SALVADORAN SUCCESSSS DEPENDED FOR BETTER OR WORSE ON CONTINUED

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U.S. ASSISTANCE WHICH IN TURN DEPENDED ON PUBLIC OPINION AND SALVADOR'S WORLD IMAGE. GARCIA AGREED AND ADDED THAT UNFORTUNATELY GUATEMALANS HAD YET TO FIGURE THIS OUT.

8. PUBLIC OPINION AND CONGRESS.

I SAID PUBLIC OPINION WAS CRITICAL FACTOR IN CONGRESSIONAL DECISIONS. ADMINISTRATION IN GENERAL AND ENDERS IN PARTICULAR WERE HAVING HARD TIME DEFENDING PROGRAM DESIGNED TO HELP EL SALVADOR. THEY WOULD SUCCEED THIS TIME, BUT HE SHOULD NEVER FORGET THAT WITHIN SIX MONTHS PRESIDENT WOULD AGAIN

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HAVE TO FACE CERTIFICATION DECISION. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS WOULD BE APPROACHING AND LEGISLATIVE BATTLE OVER PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTARY APPROPRIATION FOR ECONOMIC AID AS WELL AS 1983 BUDGET FOR BOTH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WOULD BE RAGING. ABUSES JUST HAVE TO BE CONTROLLED. HE AGREED.

9. NEED TO GO ON OFFENSIVE.

THEN I SWITCHED GEARS AND SAID PROBLEM OF CONTROL OF HIS FORCES WAS ALL THE MORE SERIOUS BECAUSE THERE WAS IMPERATIVE NEED TO TAKE OFFENSIVE NOW TO DISRUPT GROWING GUERRILLA EFFORTS AIMED BOTH AT WRECKING ELECTIONS AND DESTROYING SALVADORAN WILL TO RESIST. EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD BE NICE TO WAIT UNTIL NEW BATTALIONS AND OFFICERS WERE TRAINED AND IN ACTION (LATE MAY) THAT WOULD NOT BE GOOD ENOUGH. HIS PROBLEM, I THOUGHT, WAS BOTH TO GET SUBVERSIVES OFF BALANCE AND TO DO SO WHILE ELIMINATING ABUSES.

10. THE WAR.

EARLIER IN TALK, IN REPLY TO MY REQUEST FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF WAR, FOR FIRST TIME EVER, I HEARD HIM ACKNOWLEDGE THAT WAR WAS NOT GOING WELL, ALTHOUGH HE WAS OPTIMISTIC AS EVER ABOUT LONGRUN OUTCOME. ORAZAN WAS ABOUT AS BEFORE, USULUTAN WAS MUCH WORSE, AND COUNTRYWIDE HARRASSMENT OPERATIONS OF GUERRILLAS WERE AT LEVEL OF "FULL OFFENSIVE" AND DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH. BOTH PANAMERICAN AND LITORAL HIGHWAYS HAD BEEN CUT FOR CONSIDERABLE PERIODS RECENTLY WITH SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES OF TRUCKS AND BUSES. WHEN TROOPS ARRIVED TO BREAK UP ROADBLOCKS THEY WERE ATTACKED AND SUFFERED LOSSES BEFORE GUERRILLAS ELTED AWAY INTO HILLS. MOREOVER, EVERY TIME HE

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LAUNCHED OFFENSIVE SWEEP, SUBERSIVES HAD PRIOR
KNOWLEDGE. SPREAD OF SUBYERSIVES ACTIVITY INTO WEST
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AND ALONG COAST WAS TROUBLESOME. WHEN GARCIA MENTIONED
WEST, I URGED HIM TO LOOK CLOSELY AT DEFENSES OF TWO
STRATEGIC TARGETS: GEO-THERMAL PLANT AND SATELLITE
GROUND STATION.

HE PURPORTED TO AGREE WITH WHAT I WAS SAYING ABOUT
NEED FOR QUICK SMALLER PINPOINTED OPERATIONS. "HIT
KNOWN CAMPS HARD, GETTING IN AND OUT RAPIDLY." IT
WOULD NOT BE EASY, HE SAID, MOBILITY WAS LACKING.
HOWEVER, IN PRINCIPLE, HE WANTED TO TRY A CHANGE IN
TACTICS. IF ONLY HE COULD MOUNT AN AIRBORNER OPERATION,
HE MUSED.

11. INTELLIGENCE.

MY REMARKS ABOUT BETTER USE OF INTELLIGENCE,
AMBUSH SUBYERSIVES, NEED TO TAKE PRISONERS, ETC.,
SEEMED NOT TO HAVE MUCH EFFECT, ALTHOUGH HE DID
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT BETTER USE HAD TO BE MADE OF
AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE, AS AT TOMACATEPQUE (SOMEWHAT
BELATEDLY) BUT NOT AT ILOPANGO. MY RAISING SUBJECT
WAS MEANT BESIDE INTRINSIC MERIT OR REPEATING ONCE
AGAIN OLD REFRAIN ABOUT NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE AND
INTELLIGENT USE OF INTELLIGENCE TO GIVE HIM
OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS CURRENT EMBROGLIO IN GOES
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AS IT TELATES TO OUR EFFORTS.
HE DID NOT TAKE BAIT AND, ALTHOUGH TEMPTED, I REFRAINED
FROM ASKING FUTURE OF COL. RIVAS NOW THAT COL.
GOLCHER HAS GONE BACK TO THE SOFT LIFE IN WASHINGTON.
NEVERMIND, SEPARATELY WE HAVE BEEN ASSURED RIVAS
WILL GO. (BUT WILL HE?)

12. U.S. TY INCIDENT.

GARCIA TOOK INITIATIVE TO RAISE AND REGRET
INCIDENT WHERE U.S. TY CREW WAS FIRED UPON BUT
JUSTIFIED IT IN TERMS OF ORDERS TO TROOPS TO DEFEND
CUSCUTLAN RAILROAD BRIDGE. I TOLD HIM TY CREW'S
SIDE OF STORY. WE AGREED IT LUCKY NO ONE WAS HURT.
I POINTED OUT THAT ONCE AGAIN SALVADORANS APPEARED
TO LACK CONTROL OF TROOPS.

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13. COPREFA.

WE DISCUSSED ARMED FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE (COPREFA) HANDLING OF NUEVA TRINIDAD MASSACRE. HE DEFENDED HIS BOYS; I TOLD HIM ABOUT U.S. PRESS REACTION AND URGED HIM TO IMPROVE SERVICE. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HE AND OTHERS HERE HAD REASON TO CONSIDERED MEDIA AS CLOSE TO ANOTHER ENEMY, I POINTED AOUT THAT ATTITUDE CHANGE WAS NECESSARY. HIS PEOPLE SHOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL, PARTICULARLY WHEN THEY HAD GOOD STORY TO TELL. HE ALLEGED THEY HAD TRIED AND BEEN REBUFFED; I SAID CORRESPONDENTS HERE DID NOT SEE IT THA WAY.

I TALKED ABOUT CREDIBILITY IN PRESS RELEASES AND PRESS INTERVIEWS. HE TALKED ABOUT NEED TO HOLD AND SHAPE DOMESTIC OPINION. I AGREED, BUT POINTED AOUT THERE IS NO WAY TO AVOID INTERNATIONAL MEDIA FROM PICKING UP MESSAGES SASHIONED FOR DOMESTIC AUDIENCE. ONLY STICKING TO TRUTH OR CLOSE TO TRUTH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO WORK BOTH AUDIENCES, AND OVERSEAS AUDIENCE WAS AT LEAST EQUALLY IMPORTANT. HE SAID HE RECOGNIZED IMPROVEMENTS WERE NEEDED AND WOULD SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. MAYBE I WAS RIGHT. SOMEONE WHO SPOKE ENGLISH AND WAS ACCESSIBLE TO U.S. PRESS MIGHT HELP. (IT WILL NOT BE EASY TO OVERCOME ARMY PARANOIA IN THIS AREA, BUT AS MY PAO AND I SEE IT, IT IS FACT THAT THIS INFORMATION SERVICE GENERALLY MAKES MATTERS WORSE NOT BETTER. NOR IS ANSWER ANOTHER MATTER.)

14. 506(A) ASSISTANCE.

I REVIEWED WITH HIM OUR KNOWN DELIVERY PLANS UNDER 506(A). HE THOUGH AND I AGREED THAT CHIEF OF STAFF AND COMMANDER USMIDGP SHOULD DISCUSS PRIORITIES. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HE IS NOW SHORT OF HELICOPTER

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PILOTS (FIVE ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR VARIOUS REASONS AND NOT LIKELY TO BE FOR SOME TIME) HE WAS STILL INCLINED TO PREFER EARLY ARRIVAL OF ALL OF CONTEMPLATED CHOPPERS. (THIS REQUIRES MORE THOUGHT AND COLONEL HAYES AND FLORES LIMA WILL INCLUDE SUBJECT IN THEIR REVIEW PRIORITIES.) HE TALKED ABOUT CRITICAL NEED FOR RIFLES, SAYING SOME UNITS ARE WITHOUT AND OTHERS HAVE VIRTUALLY UNWORKABLE WEAPONS.

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I SAID MORE M-16S ARE ENROUTE. NOT ENOUGH, HE THOUGHT. I MENTIONED THAT BOTH COLONEL LOPEZ NUILA (NATIONAL POLICE) AND GENERAL VIDES CASANOVA (NATIONAL GUARD) HAD TOLD ME OF THEIR NEED FOR RIFLES, WHILE OBSERVING NICETIES OF NOT ASKING, SINCE PRESUMABLY THEY KNOW WE COULD NOT RESPOND GIVEN PRIOR POLICIES REGARDING AID FOR THESE "POLICE FORCES". HE SAID ARMY COULD TRANSFER SOME OLD RIFLES, BUT SINCE THEY WERE NOT RELIABLE THAT WOULD NOT BE MUCH HELP. (HERE IS ANOTHER ISSUE FOR EVENTUAL REVIEW, BUT I THINK IT BETTER NOT PUSH AT THIS TIME GIVEN DOMESTIC OPINION CONSTRAINTS.)

15. THREAT TO U.S. PERSONNEL.
IN LIGHT OF REPORTED THREAT TO SHERATON HOTEL AND U.S. PERSONNEL STAYING THERE, I THANKED GARCIA FOR CHIEF OF STAFF'S PROMPT RESPONSE IN BEEFING UP SECURITY, ADDING THAT I HOPED IT WOULD BE MAINTAINED AT HIGH LEVEL AT LEAST THROUGH ELECTIONS. HE AGREED.

16. WHEN AT END OF CONVERSATION I ASKED GARCIA IF HE HAD ANY PREOCCUPATIONS THAT WE HAD NOT YET DEALT WITH, HE SAID ONLY ONE, "NICARAGUA". I REPLIED THAT IF WE COULD WORK EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER TO WIN WHAT ENDERS CALLS "DECISIVE BATTLE FOR CENTRAL AMERICA" IN EL SALVADOR, DAY WOULD SURELY COME TO SETTLE ACCOUNTS WITH THE SANDANISTAS.
HINTON

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 ACTION ARA-15

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SAN SA 02571 01 OF 02 032033Z

INFO OCT-01 AOC-20 AIO-07 INR-10 SC-15 OIC-02 CIAE-00
 EB-01 CDOE-00 A-01 IO-14 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00
 SY-05 MA-05 TACE-00 PM-09 PA-01 OCT-02 OMB-01
 INAE-00 CML-01 STE-00 CP-02 CPCS-02 /103 W
 -----201061 030113Z /15

O R 032312Z APR 81
 FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC HIACI IMMEDIATE 0346
 INFO AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
 AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
 AMEMBASSY MEXICO
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA
 AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE
 AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
 USCINCSO GUARRY HEIGHTSEAN/INTAFF
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
 USMISSION GENEVA
 USICA WASHDC

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 SAN SALVADOR 2671

USICA FOR AR-DACHI

DEPT PASS TO OTHER ARA AND EUR POSTS AS REQUIRED

E.O. 12065: GDS 4-8-87 (WICH, MARK) OR-M
 TAGS: MILI PINS PINT ES
 SUBJECT: DEFENSE MINISTER GARCIA'S SPEECH TO AMERICAN CHAMBER
 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

REF: SAN SALVADOR 2658


1. (U) DCM ATTENDED APRIL 2TH SPEECH BY SALVADORAN
 MINISTER OF DEFENSE JOSE GUILLERMO GARCIA TO THE AMERICAN
 CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AT THE CAMINO REAL HOTEL. WE WILL
 PROVIDE MAJOR EXCERPTS BY SEPTEL BUT MOST IMPORTANT
 THEMES WERE (1) SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES' PROFESSIONALISM,
 DEDICATION, AND DEVOTION TO THE PEOPLE; (2) MILITARY
 ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. WELCOMED AND NEEDED BUT MAJOR
 BATTLES HAD BEEN WON BY THE ARMED FORCES ALONE; AND
 (3) THAT A COUP FROM ANY SIDE WOULD "SINK THE COUNTRY"
 AND LEAD TO A LEFTIST TAKE-OVER.

2. (U) IN A SLIGHTLY MORE DEFENSIVE TONE THAN USUAL,
 DEFENSE MINISTER GARCIA ADMITTED "FAILURES AND ABUSES"
 ON THE PART OF THE ARMED FORCES BUT INSISTED THAT FOREIGN
 CRITICS FOCUSED EXCLUSIVELY ON BAD NEWS AND REFUSED TO
 TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE GOOD THINGS THE ARMED FORCES HAD
 ACHIEVED. HE LAUDED THE STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION OF
 THE ORDINARY SOLDIER, PRAISED THE HIGH PROFESSIONAL
 COMPETENCE OF THE OFFICER CORPS AND INSISTED THAT
 CONSTANT EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE TO LIMIT EXCESSES ON
 THE PART OF THE SECURITY FORCES. DURING THE QUESTION
 AND ANSWER PERIOD, COLONEL GARCIA ADDRESSED A QUESTION
 REGARDING THE MURDER OF SOME 23 PEOPLE IN SOYAPANGO
 THE NIGHT OF APRIL 7; GARCIA SAID THAT THE COMMUNIQUE
 FROM THE SECURITY UNIT INVOLVED HAD BEEN PUBLISHED AND
 THAT HE HAD NO MORE DETAILS AT THIS TIME BUT THAT AN
 INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION WOULD BE MADE OF THIS INCIDENT.

3. (U) IN A MAJOR PORTION OF HIS SPEECH AND LATER IN
 ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, GARCIA INSISTED THAT ANY ARMED
 FORCES WOULD WELCOME MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND THAT GOING
 SO CARRIED NO IMPLICATION OF DEPENDENCY OR CONTROL.
 GARCIA STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT THE SALVADORAN ARMED
 FORCES HAD DEFEATED THE "FINAL OFFENSIVE" OF JANUARY 10
 WITH THEIR OWN RESOURCES AND THAT U.S. MILITARY
 ASSISTANCE HAD ONLY BEEN RESUMED SOME FIVE DAYS AFTER

THE MAJOR ASSAULT. HE SAID THAT THIS MATERIEL AID
 WAS IMPORTANT TO ASSURE THE SUCCESS OF THE GOVERNMENT
 IN ITS STRUGGLE BUT THAT THE DETERMINATION AND COURAGE
 OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE PEOPLE'S REJECTION OF THE
 LEFTIST APPEALS WERE THE KEY INGREDIENTS FOR DEFEATING
 THE INSURGENCY. IN THE SPEECH AND LATER, GARCIA
 ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS AGAINST INNOCENT
 INDIVIDUALS BY THE ARMED FORCES BUT INSISTED THAT
 EVERY EFFORT WAS BEING MADE TO CURB THESE ABUSES AND
 ACCUSED THE LEFT OF AS BAD OR WORSE CONDUCT WHICH THE
 FOREIGN PRESS TENDED TO IGNORE. HE SAID THAT THE STRUGGLE
 WOULD BE A LONG ONE AND THAT DISCIPLINE AND CONVICTION
 WERE CRUCIAL TO SUCCESS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION,
 GARCIA ALSO STRESSED THAT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS HAD TO BE
 RESOLVED AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT COUNTED HEAVILY ON THE
 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR. HE WAS CERTAIN
 THAT PLANS WERE BEING MADE TO MOBILIZE THEIR SUPPORT.
 THIS GAINED HIM A ROUND OF APPLAUSE.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.



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EXHIBIT N

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

TTTCZYUW RUEJAL7730 2872049
IMMEDIATE/PRIORITY
P 141631Z OCT 81

TO DIA WASH DC//DB-3E2/JSI-48/RSS-1

INFO USCINCSO QUARRY MTS PM//SCJ2 CDR JSOC FT BEAGE MC//J-2//
CDR 470TH MI GP FT CLAYTON PM//IAGPP-PH
CDR 193RD INF BDE (PAN) FT CLAYTON PM//AFZU-DS
CCCJTF KEY WEST FL//J-2
MACOS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//JW

CINCLANT NORFOLK AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
CDRUSAITAC AMS VA//IAX-TA-C

BT

SECTION 1 OF 2

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS SENT TO THE ABOVE ADDRESSES ON
25 APR WITH DTG OF 252000Z APR 81. THIS MESSAGE IS
BEING REPEATED DUE TO CLAIMED NON-RECEIPT BY ACTION
ADDRESSEE

QUOTE

SUBJ: IR [REDACTED] EL SALVADOR/STATUS OF THE NEW
ATLACATL BATTALION/(U)
THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
1. (U) CTRY: EL SALVADOR (ES)
2. (U) IR NO: [REDACTED]
3. (U) TITLE: STATUS OF THE NEW ATLACATL BATTALION
4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 810423

B. SUMMARY: (ENTIRE TEXT [REDACTED])
A. THE "QUICK REACTION ATLACATL BATTALION" OF THE SALVADORAN
ARMY HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED AND IT IS IN THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZING
ITSELF. AT PRESENT, THIS UNIT IS UNIQUE IN THE ARMY FOR THE
FOLLOWING REASONS:
- IT WILL BE THE TARGETS UNIT IN THE ARMY.
- IT IS A VOLUNTEER FORCE DRAWN FROM SOLDIERS AND CIVILIAN WHO HAVE
COMPLETED THEIR OBLIGATORY MILITARY SERVICE.
- IT IS MADE UP OF TROOPS FROM ALL OVER THE NATION RATHER THAN
FROM JUST ONE REGION.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, THE COMMANDER OF THE ATLACATL BATTALION WILL
EVENTUALLY BECOME A KEY FIGURE IN THE POLITICAL-MILITARY EQUATION
OF EL SALVADOR.
B. AS OF 23 APRIL 1981, THE STATUS OF THE BATTALION IS AS FOLLOWS:
(1) LOCATION: THE BATTALION IS STATIONED IN THE VICINITY OF SITIO
DEL NIÑO [REDACTED] LA LIBERTAD DEPARTMENT.
(2) PERSONNEL:
THE BATTALION CURRENTLY IS AT FULL STRENGTH EXCEPT FOR COMPANY GRADE
OFFICERS. [REDACTED]
BECAUSE THE TROOPS ARE SECOND TERM ENLISTEES THEY ARE SLIGHTLY
OLDER THAN THE AVERAGE SALVADORAN SOLDIER. THEIR MORALE AND
HEALTH ARE GOOD EVENTUALLY. TROOPS OF THE BATTALION WILL UTILIZE
A BROWN BERT TO DISTINGUISH THEM FROM THE REMAINDER OF THE

(U, 6, 7, 8, F)
ACTION DB-3E2(1) DIA(1)
INFO MIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) JS(2) RDTF:LO(1) SECDEF:(*)
SECDEF(7) USDP(16) ASD:PA&E(1) DI-1(1) NMIC(*)
RTS-28(*) RCM-281(0) RSS-1(1) SWS(1) JSI-48(*)
DC-4(1) AT(1) AAT-X(1) AIS(1) DIO(1) DE(1) DB-1G(1)
DB-3E(2) DB-4A(1) DB-5(1) DB-1E(1) DT-1(1)
+CSA WASHINGTON DC
+CNO WASHINGTON DC
+CSAF WASHINGTON DC
+CIA WASHINGTON DC
+SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
+DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

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ARMED FORCES. THE COMMANDER OF THE BATTALION IS LT COL
DOMINGO JOSE ((MONTERROSA)). (SEE IR [REDACTED] CONCERNING
HIS APPOINTMENT.)
(3) ORGANIZATION:

ONE HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICES COMPANY [REDACTED] AND ONE
MECHANIZED RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON [REDACTED]. THESE UNITS ARE
ALL FORMED; HOWEVER, THEY HAVE ONLY MINIMAL EQUIPMENT ON HAND.
(SEE BELOW).
(B) THE MECHANIZED UNIT AND THE COMBAT SUPPORT COMPANY CURRENTLY
ARE PERFORMING AS LIGHT INFANTRY. IF THEIR EQUIPMENT ARRIVES,
THEY WILL BEGIN TRAINING IN THEIR COMBAT SPECIALTIES. TO DATE,
IT HAS NOT BEEN DECIDED WHAT TYPE OF VEHICLE WILL BE UTILIZED IN
THE MECHANIZED RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRON.
(C) INITIALLY, IT WAS PLANNED TO GIVE THE BATTALION FOUR ORGANIC
HELICOPTERS (UH-1H). SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF
THOUGHT IT WOULD BETTER TO STATION FOUR HELICOPTERS AT THE
BATTALION, BUT TO ROTATE THEM, THUS ALLOWING MAINTENANCE
TO BE UNDERTAKEN AT THE AIR FORCE BASE AT ILOPANGO [REDACTED].
THE FINAL DECISION HAS NOT BEEN MADE ON THIS SUBJECT.
(D) THE BATTALION STAFF WAS MODELED ON THE STANDARD STAFF OF A
DEPARTMENTAL COMMAND WHICH HAS PROVEN INADEQUATE DUE TO THE
FACT THAT THE S-1/S-4 AND S-2/S-3 ARE COMBINED. A LARGER
STAFF IS REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE SIZE OF THE UNIT AND
THE COMPLEXITIES OF ITS ORGANIZATION.

(4) OPERATIONS:

(1) THE BATTALION IS SUBORDINATED DIRECTLY UNDER THE CHIEF OF THE
ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF; ITS MISSION WILL BE TO PERFORM AS A
COUNTERGUERRILLA REACTION FORCE IN ANY SECTOR OF THE COUNTRY. [REDACTED]

THE UNIT HAS
BEEN TASKED TO SEND SEPARATE RIFLE COMPANIES TO DIFFICULT INSURGENCY
AREAS TO AUGMENT HARD PRESSED DEPARTMENTAL COMMANDS.

(B) THE BATTALION HAS NOT BEEN ATTACKED BY GUERRILLAS; HOWEVER,
CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR PERIMETER DEFENSE HAVE BEEN MADE. THIS EFFORT
HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH THE NEIGHBORING CAVALRY REGIMENT.

(6) INTELLIGENCE:

MCN=81287/03814

TOR=81287/2321Z

TAD=81287/2327Z

CDSN=MAK332

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CFT OT OF 02

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

DTTCZYUW RUESALA7739 2672069
IMMEDIATE/PRIORITY
O P 141631Z OCT 81

TO DIA WASH DC//DB-3E2/J51-48/RSS-1

INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PH//SCJ2 CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC//J-2//
CDR 470TH MI GP FT CLAYTON PH//IAGPP-PH
CDR183RD INF BDE(PAN) FT CLAYTON PH//AFZU-DS
CCCJTF KEY WEST FL//J-2
MACOS INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//INW

CINCLANT NORFOLK AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
COMUSAITAC AMS VA//IAX-TA-C

BT

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(6) EQUIPMENT

ALL TROOPS ARE ARMED WITH THE M-16. THE ENTIRE UNIT ONLY HAS
60MM MORTARS. THERE ARE NO MACHINEGUNS OR 81MM MORTARS IN THE
BATTALION. THERE IS NO ORGANIC TROOP TRANSPORT IN THE UNIT.

HOWEVER,

THE "QUICK REACTION ATLACATL BATTALION"
IS A LIGHT INFANTRY UNIT THAT CAN ONLY MOVE ON FOOT UNLESS VEHICLES
ARE DISPATCHED FROM ANOTHER ORGANIZATION TO THE BATTALION.

(7) COMMUNICATIONS:

THE COMMANDER OF THE BATTALION COMMUNICATES WITH THE ARMED FORCES
GENERAL STAFF BY UTILIZING A MOTOROLA HT-600. UHF FM. HAND- OLD
RADIO. NO OTHER SYSTEM CURRENTLY EXISTS EXCEPT COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE.
THE PLAN FOR INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS IS THAT BATTALION HEADQUARTERS
WILL COMMUNICATE WITH ITS COMPANIES BY URC-77 AND THE COMPANIES
WILL COMMUNICATE WITH THEIR PLATOONS BY PRC-77 THERE ARE PRC-77
AND VRC-64 PRESENTLY IN THE UNIT.

(8) INSTALLATIONS:

THE UNIT IS GARRISONED AT THE FORMER "ESCUELA NORMAL DE MAESTRAS
ALBERTO MASFERRER". THE BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS ARE IN SATISFACTORY
CONDITION; HOWEVER, PROBLEMS NEED CORRECTION IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS:

- WATER SUPPLY
- ELECTRICITY
- SANITATION
- REFRIGERATION

9A. (U) DETAILS: NONE

9B. THIS REPORT UPDATES IR

SUBJ: CREATION OF A NEW BATTALION.

10. (U) PROJ NO: N/A

11. (U) COLL MGMT CODES: NONE

12. (U) SPEC INST: N/A

13. (U)

14. (U)

15. (U) REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: NONE

16. (U) ENCL: N/A

17. (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

BT

ACTION DB-3E2(1) DIA(1) (I,M)

INFO NIDS(*) J3:NMCC(*) J5(2) RJTTF:LO(1) SECDEF:(*)
SECDEF(7) USDP(15) ASD:PA&E(1) DI-1(1) NMIC(*)
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+CSA WASHINGTON DC
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+CIA WASHINGTON DC
+SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
+CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
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MCN=81287/03723

TOR=81287/2300Z

TAD=81287/2334Z

CDSN=MAK350

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SECT 02 OF 02

EXHIBIT O

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TEXT: 1. (C/NF) AS THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ALLEGED EL MOZOTE //GEO COORD 1355N 8808W// MASSACRE BY BIRI ATACATL TROOPS APPROACHES, THE ISSUE IS GAINING CONSIDERABLE MOMENTUM AS A RENEWED HUMAN RIGHTS RALLYING CRY. THE FOLLOWING IS A RE-TRANSMITTAL OF THE ONLY ON-STATION USDAO SAN SALVADOR DOCUMENTATION OF THE ALLEGED INCIDENT. IT IS RE-TRANSMITTED AS A BASELINE DOCUMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. COMMUNITY-WIDE DOCUMENT SEARCH IS REQUESTED ON BEHALF OF AMBASSADOR. RE-TRANSMITTED IIR IS CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN IN ENTIRETY.

BEGIN QUOTE:

- FROM: USDAO SAN SALVADOR ES
- TO: DIA WASH DC//JSI-4B/OS-1 /DB-3E2//DB-3E
- INFO: USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN//SCJ2
- CDR193RDINFBDE(PAN) FT CLAYTON PN//IAGPP-PN
- COMUSFORCARIB KEY WEST FL//J2
- USDAO GUATEMALA CITY GT
- USDAO MEXICO CITY MX
- CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN
- SUBJ: IR 6 829 0038 82/EL SALVADOR/CONVERSATION WITH ATACATL BATTALION OFFICERS CONCERNING ALLEGED MIS-CONDUCT OF THE ARMY IN MORAZAN DEPARTMENT/(U)
- THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTEL
- 1. (U) CTRY: EL SALVADOR (ES)
- 2. (U) IR NO: 6 829 0038 82
- 3. (U) TITLE: CONVERSATION WITH ATACATL BATTALION OFFICERS CONCERNING ALLEGED MIS-CONDUCT OF THE ARMY IN MORAZAN DEPARTMENT.
- 4. (U) DATE OF INFO: 820201
- 5. (U) ORIG: USDAO SAN SALVADOR, ES
- 6. [REDACTED] *NIC*
- 7. (U) SOURCE: [REDACTED] *(C) S/M*
- 8. (C/NOFORN) SUMMARY: (ENTIRE TEXT) CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN) THIS IR PROVIDES A SUMMARY OF REMARKS MADE BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOSE DOMINGO ((MONTERROSA)), COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE ATACATL BATTALION; MAJOR JESUS NATIVIDAL ((CASERES)), EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE ATACATL BATTALION; MAJOR JOSE ARMANDO

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((AZMITIA)) MELARA, S-3 OF THE ATACATL BATTALION ON THE ALLEGATIONS THAT ATROCITIES WERE COMMITTED BY ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF EL SALVADOR. THE INCIDENT DISCUSSED IN THESE CONVERSATIONS IS ALLEGED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE VICINITY OF EL MOZOTE (1355N-8808W), MORAZAN DEPARTMENT, DURING OPERATION "RESCATE" (6-17 DECEMBER 1981). THE ATACATL BATTALION PARTICIPATED IN OPERATION "RESCATE".

- 9A. (C/NOFORN) DETAILS: (ENTIRE TEXT CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)

- (1) THE EXACT PURPOSE OF RO'S VISIT TO THE ATACATL BATTALION (I.E. TO DETERMINE THE MISSION ASSIGNED, AND SUCCESSIVE POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY THE BATTALION DURING OPERATION "RESCATE"; AND TO SPECIFICALLY DETERMINE IF THE BATTALION, OR ELEMENTS THEREOF, WERE INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING AROUND AND IN EL MOZOTE, MORAZAN DEPARTMENT DURING THAT OPERATION) WAS PUT TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER, LTC MONTERROSA SHORTLY AFTER GREETINGS AND PLEASANTRIES WERE EXCHANGED. LTC MONTERROSA REMAINED DISTANTLY COURTEOUS, BUT HE FIRMLY TOLD RO THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO DISCUSS THESE SPECIFIC SUBJECTS, AND THAT RO HAD BETTER OBTAIN PERMISSION FROM THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES BEFORE HE CAME WITH SUCH INQUIRIES TO HIS (LTC MONTERROSA'S) BATTALION. (RO NOTE: QUITE FRANKLY, RO FELT THAT THE INTERVIEW, ALBEIT SHORT, WAS THUS TO BE TERMINATED). RO MADE THE OBLIGATORY APOLOGIES FOR WHAT THE COLONEL MAY HAVE INTERPRETED AS IMPERTINENCE. RO ALSO POINTED OUT THAT CANDID ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS POSED WOULD FACILITATE COUNTERING RECENT PRESS RELEASES WHICH WERE LESS THAN COMPLIMENTARY TO THE ARMED FORCES OF EL SALVADOR.

- (2) AT THIS POINT MAJOR AZMITIA INTERJECTED WITH WHAT CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS A PARABLE: THE UNIT THAT HAD FOUGHT AT EL MOZOTE HAD HAD A TOUGH TIME OF IT, AND THAT BECAUSE OF THE INTENSITY AND DURATION OF THE BATTLE (RO NOTE: MAJOR AZMITIA SEEMED TO SLIP HERE, AS HE USED THE FIRST PERSON PLURAL "WHEN WE APPROACHED EL MOZOTE IN THE EARLY AFTERNOON...." "CUANDO NOS ACERCAMOS A AQUEL PUEBLO EN LA TARDE.....") THERE WERE UNDOUBTEDLY CASUALTIES AMONG NON-COMBATANTS. COL MONTERROSA THEN TOOK UP THE NARRATIVE. HE SAID THAT THE UNIT INVOLVED HAD HAD TO FIGHT THROUGH FIXED ENEMY POSITIONS, THEN, ONCE IN THE TOWN, FIRE WAS RECEIVED FROM THE HOUSES IN THE TOWN (RO NOTE: LTC MONTERROSA NOW UTILIZED THE FIRST PERSON: "I DO NOT HAVE X-RAY VISION, AND I CAN NOT SEE INSIDE THE HOUSE FROM WHICH SOMEONE IS SHOOTING AT ME; NOR IN THOSE TYPE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AM I VERY DISPOSED TO WASTE TIME TRYING TO FIND OUT WHO ELSE MIGHT BE IN THE HOUSE.") LTC MONTERROSA THEN STATED (IN THE THIRD PERSON) THAT 90MM RECOILESS RIFLES WERE USED AGAINST THE HOUSE FROM WHICH FIRE WAS RECEIVED. AT THIS

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POINT LTC MONTERROSA SAID HE WANTED TO REITERATE TO RO THAT HE DID NOT KNOW WHICH DAY (OF THE OPERATION) RO WAS INTERESTED IN, AND THAT HE WAS ONLY SPEAKING IN GENERAL, NOT SPECIFIC, TERMS ABOUT WHAT HAD OCCURRED AT EL MOZOTE.

- (3) MAJOR AZMITIA COMMENTED THAT "THEY HAD BEEN THERE (EN LA ZONA DE MOZOTE) FROM EARLY AFTERNOON UNTIL LATE IN THE AFTERNOON (DESDE LAS TEMPRANAS HORAS DE LA TARDE HASTA MUY TARDE) FIGHTING." THEN HE SWITCHED TO THE THIRD PERSON AND SAID THAT CASUALTIES HAD BEEN HEAVY (NFI) AMONG GOVERNMENT TROOPS. AS AN ASIDE, HE SAID THE FIGHTING IN ARAMBALA (1356N-8808W), MORAZAN DEPARTMENT, HAD NOT BEEN SO HEAVY.

- (4) RO ASKED LIEUTENANT COLONEL MONTERROSA IF HE KNEW IF ANY PRISONERS HAD BEEN TAKEN DURING OR AFTER THE BATTLE FOR EL MOZOTE. AGAIN, THE COLONEL ASSUMED AN ADAMANT DEMEANOR, AND SUGGESTED THAT RO CONSULT WITH THE GENERAL STAFF, OR GET PERMISSION FROM THE GENERAL STAFF TO ASK HIM SUCH QUESTIONS. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO REPEAT THAT HE COULD NOT ANSWER RO'S QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS BATTALION'S PARTICIPATION IN THE RESCATE OPERATION UNTIL HE HAD PERMISSION FROM THE GENERAL STAFF TO DO SO. THEN HE SEEMED TO MELLOW SOMEWHAT, AS HE EXPRESSED WHAT APPEARED TO BE GENUINE INTEREST IN REVIEWING THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ATLACATL BATTALION, WITH RO, IN THE ENTIRE OPERATION. IF THE GENERAL STAFF WOULD NOTIFY HIM THAT HE COULD DO SO, HE WOULD SIT DOWN WITH RO AND SHOW HIM HOW HIS BATTALION MOVED, THE ORDERS HE ISSUED (HE CLAIMED HE KEPT THESE), AND HOW THE ENEMY REACTED. LACKING GENERAL STAFF APPROVAL, HE COULD NOT, AND HE STATED HE WAS SORRY HE COULD NOT, PROVIDE RO WITH THE ASSISTANCE HE WAS SEEKING. THE INTERVIEW HAD COME TO AN END

N16

- (6) RO WAS ESCORTED TO HIS VEHICLE BY MAJOR AZMITIA, WHO ACTED APOLOGETIC ABOUT THE FACT THAT THEY COULD NOT PROVIDE MORE FACTS ABOUT EL MOZOTE, BUT HE WAS SURE THAT THE RO UNDERSTOOD WHAT LTC MONTERROSA HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT.

- 9B. (C/NOFORN) ORIG CMTS: (ENTIRE TEXT
CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN)

- (1) THE ABOVE INTERVIEW WAS ARRANGED BASED ON AN INQUIRY BY THE AMBASSADOR TO TRY AND DETERMINE WHAT UNIT OR UNITS PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON EL MOZOTE DURING OPERATION "RESCATE". RO ARRIVED AT ATLACATL BATTALION

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HEADQUARTERS SHORTLY AFTER 1500 HOURS (L) ON 1 FEBRUARY 1982
HE LEFT SHORTLY AFTER 1700 HOURS (L).

(2) MAJOR AZMITIA WAS PRESENT DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD RO SPENT WITH LTC MONTERROSA; MAJ CASERES ENTERED ABOUT MID-DISCUSSION. [REDACTED] NIG

(3) ALL THREE OFFICERS MENTIONED IN THIS REPORT WERE IN MORAZAN DEPARTMENT DURING OPERATION "RESCATE", ALTHOUGH MAJOR CASERES APPARENTLY SPENT PERIODS AT THE BATTALION HEADQUARTERS AT SITIO DEL NINO (1348N-8922W) DURING THE OPERATION.

(4) THE TWO HOURS SPENT WITH THESE THREE OFFICERS WAS INTERESTING TO SAY THE LEAST. THE NUANCES, SUBTILITIES AND INDIRECT COMPARISONS USED BY LTC MONTERROSA AND MAJ AZMITIA WERE INTRIGUING. YET THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS REMAIN WITHOUT DEFINITIVE ANSWERS.

(5) RO'S PERSONAL OPINION, AND HE EMPHASIZES "PERSONAL", IS THAT ATACATL BATTALION OR ELEMENTS THEREIN PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON EL MOZOTE. PRECLUDING PERMISSION FROM GENERAL GARCIA, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, DEFINITIVE ANSWERS AS TO THE MISSION, POSITIONS, AND ACTIONS PARTICIPATED IN, OF THE ATACATL BATTALION IN OPERATION "RESCATE" MAY NEVER BE FORTHCOMING.

(6) THIS IR SUPPLEMENTS IR 6 829 0034 82, AND AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 773, DTG 312020Z JAN 82.

18
DEFENSE (U) APP BY: DENNIS M. DUGGAN, COL, GS, ATTACHE.

15 (U) REQ EVAL: NO REL TO: N/A

14 (U) ENCL: N/A

13 (U) DIST BY ORIG: N/A

REVW FEB 82.

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